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Executive Summary 
 
One of the three objectives of Trócaire‟s new Governance and Human Rights 
programme (2011-2014) is “to increase the effective participation of citizens, 
especially women, the poor and marginalised, in local government decision and 
policy-making processes.”  (Trócaire, 2011b: 11).  As a first step towards this 
objective, this research aimed at investigating the effectiveness of and opportunities 
for citizen participation within the country‟s evolving decentralisation process.  The 
research was conducted over the period May-September, 2011 with a feedback 
workshop presenting preliminary findings held with programme partners in 
Bujumbura in September.   
 
Research findings are presented and analysed in three principle sections.  The first 
section draws from a wide range of studies conducted on decentralisation processes 
elsewhere in Africa to identify the benefits of the process and draw lessons from 
experiments in decentralisation elsewhere.  The potential benefits of the process are 
identified as increasing local government responsibility and accountability to citizens; 
increasing local government flexibility to address diverse needs of citizens; reducing 
corruption through enhanced oversight; and fostering the dispersal of power across 
citizens and communities.  These benefits are thought to lead to greater social and 
political stability while affording citizens a greater voice in both overseeing an 
influencing local government.  The lessons on the ground from decentralisation 
experiments elsewhere reveal that these benefits are not guaranteed however.  Key 
lessons include the fact that decentralisation is a long-term process, not a short-term 
solution and that, in the absence of active citizen engagement, can result in negative 
outcomes.  Studies of processes elsewhere reveal that legal and political frameworks 
on their own are not enough; the importation of Western structures and institutions 
without due recognition of local structures results in failure; state commitment is key, 
as is fiscal and financial transparency at a local level; and that citizen participation is 
by no means guaranteed with widespread public distrust of and disaffection from 
political structures and processes mitigating against such participation. 
 
A brief section on the history of decentralisation in Burundi reveals that, although the 
current process and procedures are new, decentralisation has had a long history in the 
country dating back to the colonial period.  Contrary to the policy and procedures 
currently in place, decentralisation in the past has been implemented in a top-down 
manner, with accountability running upward from citizens to political authorities 
rather than downward resulting in a depletion of local resources and the political and 
social exclusion of citizens.  Examining the government‟s relevant legislative and 
policy texts for decentralisation today, it becomes clear that the government‟s aim is 
now to reverse this exclusion with policy and procedures aimed at the active 
participation of citizens in planning and decision-making on developmental priorities 
within their local areas.  The different opportunities for citizen participation in local 
processes together with local government accountability mechanisms are set out in 
this section. 
 
Having examined the theory and policy of decentralisation, the second main findings 
section draws from field research in eight communes across the country to analyse 
how decentralisation works in practice.  This section builds on comprehensive studies 
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carried out on the process to date (see OAG, 2007, 2009, 2010; ABELO, 2009; 
Baltissan and Sentamba, 2011; Sentamba, 2011), to focus on an as yet understudied 
area – levels of citizen participation and local government accountability on the 
ground.  The principle finding is that although locally elected officials at commune 
level demonstrate a good understanding and knowledge of the ethos, procedures and 
mechanisms for local accountability and citizen participation, local citizens 
themselves remain largely unaware of these.  At hill level it is found that both hill 
council members and citizens are aware of just one of the three principle functions of 
hill councils.  Consequently, as there is little incentive or pressure to operationalise 
these procedures, valuable opportunities for citizen participation are being 
overlooked, and local processes at present are falling short of the outcomes and results 
set out in government policy. 
 
The third section discusses research findings in more detail to explore why this is the 
case.  Four key issues pertinent to the roll-out of Trócaire‟s GHR programme are 
identified.  First, the importance of political history and culture are underlined and it 
is argued that, in the past, Burundi‟s people have been treated more as subjects than 
citizens, with echoes of this past filtering through into contemporary political and 
social relations.  Second, it is argued that, contrary to many other donor and NGO 
interventions in this area, the key obstacle may not be local capacity but rather local 
willingness to go against the grain and engage in the radical transformation of 
political and social relations required by the process.  Third, given the enormity of the 
task in challenging these relations, it is argued that information provision / awareness 
raising / sensibilisation techniques alone will be insufficient.  An intensive 
accompaniment of citizens in participating in the various structures is proposed.  
Fourth, and finally, a key challenge identified is overcoming both widespread (and 
understandable) disaffection with political life and the active exclusion – by both the 
state but also by family, friends and neighbours – of certain groups (notably women 
and members of the Batwa community) from public life. 
 
The final section of the report re-sets the decentralisation process within the broader 
context of Burundi‟s difficult past.  Acknowledging that Trócaire‟s partners face a 
formidable task in supporting citizens in their active and sustained participation 
within local structures, it is argued that the comprehensive and robust framework in 
place at local level for citizen participation offers a real opportunity to transform the 
inherently inequitable and oppressive system of the past.  Failure to do so, it is argued, 
will lead only to frustration, anger and more conflict and it is clear that there is no 
appetite for more conflict and devastation on hills and within communes across the 
country.  In this context a series of recommendations are made aimed at a 
coordinated, inclusive and intensive support to the process in targeted areas leading to 
tangible, meaningful and transformative outcomes for government and citizens alike. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Following a one-year pilot programme in 2009-2010, in January 2011 Trócaire‟s eight  
local partners
2
came together to reflect on the governance and human rights (GHR) 
situation in the country and to elaborate a new three year programme to help tackle 
relevant challenges.  One of the key problems identified during the course of this 
week was the political marginalisation of the majority of citizens and their lack of 
control over and participation in decisions affecting their lives and livelihoods 
together with the lack of accountability of public authorities to these citizens 
(Trócaire, 2011a, Trócaire, 2011b).  Arising from this, one of the objectives of the 
new three year GHR programme (2011-2014) is “to increase the effective 
participation of citizens, especially women, the poor and marginalised, in local 
government decision and policy-making processes.”  (Trócaire, 2011b: 11).  As a first 
step towards this objective, this research aimed at investigating the effectiveness of 
and opportunities for citizen participation within the country‟s decentralisation 
process.   
 
 
 
1.1 Research context 
 
Since attaining independence in 1962, Burundi has been plagued by internal conflict 
and violence, most recently a civil war which, breaking out in 1993, lasted over ten 
years.  Involving widespread human rights violations, political manipulation and 
intimidation, this has resulted in the social, economic and political exclusion of wide 
swathes of the country‟s population. 
 
A peace agreement signed in 2000 was followed by new Constitution in 2005 and, 
with one rebel movement (FNL-Palipehutu) continuing to fight, elections were held in 
2005 leading to a new power-sharing executive with both ethnic
3
 and gender-based
4
 
quotas.  While there was hope and stability for a short time, the 2010 elections were 
marred by intimidation and violence by all contesting parties (HRW, 2009, 2010; 
Sentamba, 2010; Vandeginste, 2011).  At the time of writing, unrest continues, with 
ongoing reports of political intimidation, repression and extra-judicial political 
assassinations.   
 
These recent developments reinforce the view of many commentators (Lemarchand, 
2006; Ndikumana, 2000; Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2000; Reyntjens, 2005; Uvin, 
2009, 2010) that the causes of Burundi‟s conflict are more complex than ethnic 
grievances alone.   For these analysts, the roots and ongoing drivers of conflict lie in 
the state apparatus itself – both the “predatory bureaucracy which cares only for its 
own interests” (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2000: 370) and the struggles for resources 
among and across different groups of political elite, both of which combine to 
                                                 
2
 ACAT-Burundi, AJCB, APRODH, CEJP, Centre Ubuntu, Dushirehamwe, FORSC and Uniproba 
3
 National and commune level political institutional quotas are 60% (Hutu); 40% (Tutsi) with three 
places reserved in the national assembly and in the Senate for the ethnic minority Batwa.  
4
 There is a 30% quota for female representation in national and commune level institutions. 
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perpetuate economic and political inequality across ethnic groups and regions.  Peter 
Uvin synopsises it well… 
 
This system is at the core of Burundi‟s problems. It is an institutionalized 
system of corruption, social exclusion, impunity, unpredictability, a total lack 
of accountability and clientelism. It has gorged itself for decades on aid 
money. Every Burundian knows this system, in which small groups of people 
use the state to advance their personal interests. It is the key problem and the 
main cause of war, not ethnicity or poverty. 
        (Uvin, 2008: 109-110) 
 
The key to peace and stability in Burundi therefore appears to lie in reform of the 
system, reducing the systematic exclusion and exploitation of vast swathes of the 
country‟s population, and promoting greater equality – in access to resources, services 
and opportunities - across society broadly rather than just for the elite few.  The 
critical question is where the demand for such reform can come from.  In a system 
benefiting the select few a lot of the time, many some of the time, and the majority 
none of the time, it can only come from these marginalised citizens who have been 
systematically exploited and excluded from social and political life.  The recently 
introduced system of decentralised governance
5
 which affords a central place to 
citizens within this system presents a real opportunity for such reform.  It is in this 
context that the present research was carried out.   
 
 
 
1.2 Research aims 
 
 
The broad aims of this research were as follows: 
1. To assess the opportunities for and challenges to political engagement of 
Burundi‟s citizens at the level of the collines6 (including how, if at all, this 
might feed upward to higher levels); 
2. To assess how such engagement might affect political dynamics / relations on 
the collines. 
 
The design and methodology employed, together with challenges encountered in this 
regard, are discussed in the following section (Section 2). 
                                                 
5
 Decentralisation, in its current form, was written into the Constitution and signed into law in 2005 – 
see Section 3.1.5 for more background on this. 
6
 The colline (or hill) is the most local administrative unit in Burundi.  The country is made up of 2,910 
collines grouped into 129 communes and 17 provinces (Manirakiza, 2009: 11). 
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2.  Research Methodology 
 
The research was conducted over three principal phases culminating in the 
preparation of the present report.  This section begins by outlining the research design 
employed.  The different phases of the research are then outlined and finally the 
section ends with a discussion of some of the principle challenges encountered in 
carrying this out on the research – challenges which are pertinent to the overall roll-
out of the ensuing programme.    
 
 
2.1  Research design 
 
The research was designed to achieve three things – to draw relevant lessons from 
existing research and studies on decentralisation elsewhere; to complement existing 
research on Burundi‟s decentralisation process by focusing specifically on 
opportunities for citizen engagement within the process in line with one of the 
objectives set out in Trócaire-Burundi‟s GHR programme; and to actively engage the 
programmes‟ partners in deliberating and reflecting on the implications of the 
findings for their ongoing work within the GHR programme.  The steps and 
methodology employed in carrying this out are outlined below. 
 
 
 
2.2 Preparatory phase: secondary research 
 
A review of relevant secondary materials and literature was conducted over the period 
May-July.  As well as gathering materials on the country‟s overall political, economic 
and social situation, the review focused in particular on drawing out the key lessons 
and learning from previous studies of decentralisation, in Africa in general (including 
those on the Burundian process) and in post-conflict situations in particular. 
 
Drawing from this review, the framework of analysis set out in Section 3.2 was 
developed.  A series of semi-structured interview schedules / focus group guides 
which aimed at gathering data within each of the core areas within the framework was 
then prepared. 
  
 
2.3   Fieldwork: primary research 
 
Primary data collection took place over a four week period during the months August 
to September.  This phase of the research aimed at eliciting the experiences and 
analyses of a wide range of actors – some key informants and many randomly 
selected officials and citizens within the sites chosen.  Filling out the gaps in previous 
research on the Burundian process and focusing specifically on the research aim of 
exploring opportunities for citizen participation in the process, a particular focus was 
placed on eliciting the views and analyses of „ordinary‟ citizens (women and men) on 
the effectiveness and usefulness of local governance structures.  Field work comprised 
one week of interviews with relevant donor agencies, local NGOs and commentators 
working in the area of local governance together with three weeks of interviews and 
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focus groups with both officials within decentralised commune offices and citizens on 
the ground (see Appendix III for the full schedule of fieldwork).   
 
Primary research was conducted in eight communes distributed across five provinces 
as follows: 
 
 
 
Table 2.3a: Locations of primary research  
 
Province Communes 
Bururi Bururi, Matana, Songa 
Bubanza Gihanga, Mpanda 
Bujumbura Rurale Mugonga Manga 
Cankuzo Cendajuru 
Cibitoke Rugombo 
 
These provinces and communes were selected by three of Trócaire‟s partners 
(Uniproba, CEJP and Dushirehamwe) and represented areas where they currently 
work, as well as a relatively diverse cross-section of Burundi‟s population (in terms of 
population density, history, socio-economic conditions, ethnicity, and current levels 
of low-level conflict).   
 
Overall, 44 individual interviews and 21 focus groups (of between three and 12 
people depending on availability and willingness to participate) were conducted over 
the period of field research.  A breakdown of how these were divided across different 
actors is provided in Table 2.3b below
7
: 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 See Appendix III for the full schedule of fieldwork. 
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Table 2.3b: Interviews and focus groups with different stakeholders broken down 
by gender 
 
Methodology Number  
Interviews with donors, local NGOs and 
national commentators 
9 
(2 female, 7 male) 
Interviews with local government 
officials in each of the 8 communes 
8 
(6 Administrators (3 female, 3 male) + 2 
technical advisors (both male))  
Focus groups with elected councillors at 
commune level  
2 
(one mixed and one female group) 
Focus groups with elected councillors at 
hill level 
3 
(two male, one mixed) 
Individual interview with elected hill 
councillor 
1 
(female) 
Focus groups with randomly selected 
citizens on the hills 
16 
(7 female, 7 male, 2 mixed) 
Individual interviews with randomly 
selected citizens on the gills 
26 
(14 female, 12 male) 
Visit to Batwa sites* 2 
TOTAL 67 
 
* Focus groups and interviews were not possible at these two sites as people had 
been alerted in advance and had gathered in numbers too large (over 150 in both 
cases) to facilitate in-depth discussion and exchange (see Section 2.6 below). 
 
These interviews sought to identify areas of focus among actors working in this area 
to date, together with gaps / opportunities for a value-added contribution from 
Trócaire in this regard.  Moreover, given the importance of political context to 
decentralisation (see the following section), the interviews also explored the current 
socio-political context within which the process is embedded.   
 
 
 
2.4   Workshop with Trócaire partners 
 
Following the phase of fieldwork, preliminary findings were collated and presented at 
a two day workshop held in Bujumbura with programme partners facilitated by Mr. 
Mark Cumming of Trócaire-Ireland.  The aim of this workshop was to give partners 
an opportunity to comment on and discuss the preliminary findings and 
recommendations as well as to reflect upon and consider how these might feed into 
the GHR programme overall and their own projects within this in particular.   
 
 
 
2.5   Final report 
 
This final report was prepared and finalised in the weeks following the author‟s return 
to Ireland.  
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2.6  Challenges and limitations to the research 
 
Departing from the more traditional consultancy model
8
, this research represents a 
novel, innovative model of collaboration in that the research aims, design and terms 
of reference
9
 were jointly negotiated and agreed between the researcher and Trócaire-
Burundi so that benefits could be maximised for both parties.  As with all research 
projects, the research met with a number of challenges and limitations.  These are 
discussed under five main headings below. 
 
 Generalisability of findings from samples: The principal limitation of any 
research examining broad-ranging, complex processes involving a wide 
number of actors is the impossibility of conducting in-depth research with all 
actors across all fields.  The solution is to sample.  In this case, a purposive 
sample of communes was selected with the aim of covering a diverse cross-
section of administrative units and actors.  While the findings uncovered relate 
directly to just these sample areas and populations, the logic in sampling 
across a diverse range of cases is that the greater the similarities in findings, 
the greater the probability that such findings relate to other cases also – i.e. the 
stronger the case for generalisation of findings.  Given the diversity of cases 
selected for this study, the level of similarity in findings across all cases 
examined is striking.  This strengthens the case for generalisability of the 
findings.   
 
 Range vs. depth: Very much related to this first point is the range versus 
depth issue – i.e. how much time to spend at each site engaging with interview 
and focus group participants.  In this research we experienced some tension in 
perhaps trying to cover too much ground in the time available and initial field 
research programmes were modified to allow for more time to engage with 
research participants.  While some programme partners were keen to include 
as many communes and collines as possible, it was necessary to restrict this 
range in order to have time to engage meaningfully in the communes and 
collines we did work in.  This approach may also be pertinent to strategies of 
action within the GHR programme (see also Section 4). 
 
 Random selection of participants: A further challenge encountered in the 
research involved difficulties in randomly selecting participants for focus 
groups and interviews in a context where NGOs (and citizens) are used to 
organising and calling people to meetings in advance.  The logic of the 
random sampling was to ensure that a cross-section of people were involved 
and not just local leaders or elites with particular experiences or interests.  
Difficulties in this regard were experienced in particular in the first week of 
                                                 
8
 The more common practice of employing an outside consultant to carry out research has been 
critiqued as undermining research capacity within African universities (see Sawyerr, 2004) and may 
also be regarded as missing out on opportunities for research capacity building within NGOs 
themselves. 
9
 See Appendix II for the Terms of Reference. 
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the field research where a number of meetings with local citizens had been 
organised in advance and the large numbers at these meetings made in-depth 
discussions on issues impossible.  These difficulties were countered by adding 
some impromptu visits to villages and settlements with no advance notice.  
This method was also used in the subsequent weeks of field research. 
 
 Talking with vs. talking at: Primary research is above all about listening to 
and engaging with respondents in an effort to comprehend where they are 
coming from.  It is about listening and learning, not „sensibilising‟ or advising.  
Judgements are withheld and the floor is given to respondents to share their 
views and analyses.  At times this posed a challenge in the research process as 
some NGO partners were eager to react immediately to responses given, 
occasionally admonishing respondents for not interacting with local authorities 
even though we had not yet explored why this was the case.  Again, this point 
is perhaps pertinent to the roll-out of the GHR programme where it will be 
important to engage with citizen‟s rationale for choosing to interact or not to 
interact with local governance structures rather than simply urging them to do 
so regardless of their views and experiences (see also Section 3). 
 
 Ownership and application of the research findings/recommendations: 
The final challenge is common to all policy and practice-oriented research.  
One the report is produced, what happens next?  While the research process 
itself aimed at involving programme partners as much as possible, with the 
workshop in particular aimed at moving discussion forward onto the 
implications for the GHR programme, it now remains for programme partners 
themselves to take ownership of the findings and recommendations (and this 
can mean agreement or rejection of these – this is entirely up to partners), 
using these to reflect on the future direction and strategy of the programme.  
This is always a challenge, but one worth tackling.   
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3.  Research findings and analysis 
 
The following section sets out the principle findings from both primary and secondary 
sources.  The first sub-section draws on broader literature together with the relevant 
Burundian texts to examine a) what decentralisation means in different contexts; b) 
what lessons have been learned from experiences elsewhere; c) what decentralisation 
has meant in the past in Burundi; and d) what it means in Burundi now.  The second 
sub-section presents findings from the fieldwork, analysing these in the context of 
opportunities posed for enhanced citizen participation and voice.  Drawing the key 
findings together, the final sub-section discusses four important issues which, it is 
recommended, should underpin Trócaire‟s GHR programme over the next number of 
years. 
 
 
3.1  Background to Decentralisation 
 
3.1.1 What exactly is decentralisation? 
 
Like many complex concepts, decentralisation means different things to different 
people and the term can be used to refer to a range of forms of power-sharing 
arrangements and also a range of objectives to be achieved.  Rondinelli (1998) 
characterises decentralised governance as taking one of the following three main 
forms: 
 
Delegation: This is where there is a transfer of responsibility for specifically 
defined functions and activities.  The central state retains overall control. 
 
Deconcentration: This is where there is a transfer of power to an 
administrative unit of the central government at local level.  Local officials are 
typically not elected, but appointed.  The central state retains control over 
resources and priorities. 
 
Devolution: This is where there is a transfer of power to locally elected 
officials.  Financial resources are devolved from the centre to local 
government.  Local officials gain a degree of political autonomy.  
 
Across these different forms, there are three further aspects to decentralisation.   
 
Administrative decentralisation involves a transfer of responsibilities for 
local services (e.g. schools, health clinics, water points, roads etc…). 
 
Economic/financial or fiscal decentralisation involves the transfer of 
financial resources together with the authorisation for the local authorities to 
generate their own revenues through tax collection etc… 
 
Political decentralisation involves the transfer of political authority to the 
local level through the establishment of elected local government, together 
with opportunities for active participation of citizens.  
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In short, decentralisation is a process which evolves over time rather than a final 
product delivered in the form of a set range of structures and institutions which 
become instantly functional.  It can take many shapes and forms and these can (and 
necessarily will) evolve over time.  It is the active engagement of a range of different 
actors – state and civic – within this process which, in large measure, determines the 
benefits that decentralisation can bring. 
 
 
3.1.2 Why bother?: The potential benefits of decentralisation 
 
The potential benefits of decentralisation are many – though it should be noted that, in 
practice, many of these remain to be seen.  Among the many attributes ascribed to it, 
it is thought to: 
 
 Increase government responsiveness and accountability to citizens; 
 Increase government flexibility to address the diverse needs of often 
highly heterogeneous populations; 
 Reduce corruption through enhanced oversight; 
 Foster the dispersal of power from what have often been highly 
monopolised political structures. 
 
It is argued (Crook, 2003; Smoke, 2003; Devas and Delay, 2006; Siegle and 
O‟Mahoney, 2008) that decentralisation enhances political legitimacy while 
strengthening a sense of citizen ownership of their government, in turn fostering 
greater social and political stability.  Thus, in theory at any rate, decentralisation 
offers the potential to increase stability and peace while affording citizens a greater 
voice in both overseeing and influencing local government.  In short, decentralisation 
offers the potential for those previously exploited and marginalised by the „system‟ 
(see Section 1.1) to engage with it, to press for its reform, and to ensure it operates for 
the good of society at large rather than a select few.   
 
However, many of these attributes are aspirational (what decentralisation, if it works 
well, should do) rather than real (what is seen in practice).  It has already been noted 
that decentralisation is a process to be engaged with – with this level and strategy of 
engagement determining its effectiveness and success, rather than an end product 
delivered in the form of set institutions and practices which are complete and effective 
in themselves.  When reflecting on how to engage with the process therefore, it is 
useful to examine what lessons may be learned from experiences of decentralisation 
elsewhere.  The principles lessons from research carried out to date are set out in the 
following sub-section. 
 
 
3.1.3 Lessons from elsewhere 
 
Decentralisation policies and structures have been introduced in 80 per cent of all 
developing and transition countries over the past two decades (Crawford and 
Hartmann, 2008: 7).  There are therefore some lessons to be learned from other 
experiences although care should be taken in inferring too broadly from these studies, 
particularly since studies on decentralisation both in Africa generally and in post-
conflict contexts more specifically are somewhat limited.  Moreover, many of these 
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take the form of broad-based cross-national surveys based on secondary sources 
which, though providing valuable „big picture‟ analyses, miss out the varying 
contextual factors specific to particular countries and their experiences.   
 
These caveats notwithstanding, there are seven lessons which we can usefully draw 
from experiences of and research on decentralisation to date. 
 
 
1. Decentralisation is a long-term process and its success is not guaranteed: As 
noted earlier, decentralisation is a process rather than a final product.  It 
requires a high level of investment from state and civic actors to make it work 
and this takes time.  According to one view (OECD, 2004), decentralisation 
takes well over ten years to reap tangible benefits for local communities.  
Moreover, there is no single prescription for which form of decentralisation 
proves most effective.  According to Siegle and O‟Mahoney (2008), different 
forms of decentralisation (from delegation to deconcentration to devolution) 
are suitable in different contexts and complete devolution, although it is often 
interpreted and understood as the most advanced form of decentralisation, may 
not be the best form if the commitment and capacities are not in place to 
manage it effectively. 
 
2. Decentralisation can result in negative outcomes: In theory, decentralisation 
is said to lead to increased local accountability and responsiveness of political 
leaders.  However, this is against a backdrop of what may often be a highly 
centralised, controlled and controlling regime where state control of resources 
for political mobilisation through neo-patrimonial networks is deeply 
entrenched (UNDP, 2009).  And so for example, following a study of three 
regional governments in Ethiopia, Chanie (2007) concludes that 
decentralisation remains unsuccessful in these cases due to the clientelistic 
relationship between the central and regional political parties.  In a wide-
ranging study of the Ghanaian process, Crawford (2009) argues that 
decentralisation has proven more effective in centralising national state control 
and mobilising support for the ruling party than in bringing benefits to citizens 
as a whole.  As we have seen, for proponents of administrative 
decentralisation, the potential for improved service design and delivery lies at 
the heart of aspirations for the process.  Yet studies to date show little 
evidence of link between decentralisation and improved service delivery 
(Conyers, 2007; Booth, 2010).  Indeed, Treisman (2000) has found 
correlations between decentralisation and increased corruption while Linz and 
Stepan (2000) find links to increasing inequality.  Moreover, the limited 
research on decentralisation in post-conflict contexts indicates a lower success 
rate than elsewhere (Lake and Rothchild, 2005; Siegle and O‟Mahoney, 2008).   
 
The key question here is why.  Why have a number of other experiences 
proven unsuccessful and what are the key issues to be addressed in 
maximising the potential for success in the Burundian context?  The next five 
points highlight some specific issues of pertinence when engaging with 
decentralisation and working towards positive outcomes. 
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3. Legal and political frameworks alone are not enough: Many analysts (see for 
example Uvin, 2008; Barrios and Ahamed, 2010) have noted that much of the 
support to decentralisation processes worldwide takes the form of support in 
setting up the legal and political frameworks and the structures and procedures 
through which the process may operate.  While these frameworks and 
procedures are undoubtedly important, these analysts argue that this is an 
overly technical approach which is pushed by donor agencies in particular and 
that it conceals the highly political nature of the process.  Consequently, as 
Trócaire has observed in its review of a number of processes in Southern 
African countries, very often legal frameworks and policies are in place but 
they are not implemented in practice (Trócaire, 2008).  Support to 
decentralisation processes need to move beyond legal and political 
frameworks alone and engage with the power relations and political dynamics 
which underpin what is an explicitly political process.   
 
4. Importation of Western structures and institutions does not work: Within 
decentralisation, as within governance more broadly, it is now recognised that 
that the wholescale importation of Western models/structures/institutions 
without due recognition of and efforts to feed into local governance structures 
simply does not work (see Uvin on Burundi, 2008; Chabal, 2009; and Booth, 
2010 on Africa more broadly).  Therefore, decentralisation processes need to 
build on and work from local governance arrangements.  As Ogbahara (2008: 
396) notes, “Reforms in local governance structures succeed when they 
complement, rely on and accommodate the social institutions of disaffected 
and historically marginalised communities, while also taming informal „client-
network‟ relationships”.  They do not work when they ignore both the history 
of state formation (Trócaire, 2008) and existing forms of governance, whether 
inclusive or exclusive.  Nor do they work when they seek to „socially 
engineer‟ new forms of social and political organisation which are more suited 
to particular Western than local contexts – see for example Vervisch and 
Titeca (2010) on donor enthusiasm for local associations in a Burundian 
context.  
 
5. State commitment is key: In a wide-ranging review of decentralisation 
processes across the world, the OECD in 2004 concluded that state 
commitment to the process overall has been weak.  As we have seen above, 
studies from Ethiopia and Ghana demonstrate that states have used the process 
to consolidate and build their clientelist networks and political support base 
rather than distribute power across citizens as envisaged by architects of the 
process.  As Crawford (2009: 58) argues, “the political intent behind supposed 
decentralisation reforms can often be increased centralisation of control.... 
[national governments] attempt to extend and strengthen their control at local 
level or as a means to mobilise support for the ruling party in peripheral 
areas.” (2009: 58).  These contributions are significant in the Burundian 
context, a political context where, according to Brachet and Wolpe (2005: 7) 
“Authoritarianism, corruption and nepotism have shaped institutions and 
relations between government and citizens... There is a huge chasm between 
the country‟s national leaders and Burundi‟s grassroots”.   
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6. Fiscal and financial transparency is key: Studies across a wide range of 
countries all point to the importance of financially resourcing local structures 
in a completely open and transparent manner, ensuring equity and 
accountability in resource distribution.  Finance should come through the 
devolution of national budgets together with possibly local revenue generation 
(although some studies (see Schou and Haug, 2005) indicate that this latter 
activity may enhance conflict in post-conflict situations).  This lesson 
notwithstanding, the average budget allocation to local government in sub-
Saharan Africa is less than 5 per cent of the overall national budget, while the 
global average stands at 14 per cent (Siegle and O‟Mahoney, 2008).  Most 
important is that the local community be informed and consulted on budgetary 
matters, and that correlations between increased levels of local government 
expenditures, local employment and service provision be readily apparent to 
all (Conyers, 2007; UNDP, 2009).   
 
7. Citizen participation is not guaranteed: While citizen participation, which 
lies at the heart of decentralisation, can and should (in theory in any case) lead 
to increased local democracy – with decentralised structures acting as „schools 
of democracy‟ in Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardans‟ (2003) words, such 
aspirations perhaps overestimate citizens‟ enthusiasm for participation in these 
structures.  Trócaire (2008), in its review of decentralisation in Southern 
Africa, found a high level of disinterest locally in the process.  Various 
reasons for this include the partial autonomy of local areas and the closer links 
between citizens and local aid / NGO projects than between citizens and 
political leaders (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan, 2003), together with a 
distrust of political leaders from“...a deeply alienated and cynical population 
that views its leaders as self-serving, corrupt and unresponsive”(Brachet and 
Wolpe, 2005: 7; Uvin, 2008 on Burundi; see also Siegle and O‟Mahoney, 
2008 more broadly). 
 
 
And so what can we learn from the research into other country‟s experiences?  We 
learn that decentralisation offers the potential for significant benefits to local 
communities and citizens.  But we also learn that these benefits are certainly not a 
given.  In particular, the compatibility of new structures and procedures with those 
existing already together with the existing and evolving political climate both in terms 
of state commitment and citizen interest represent key determining factors in the 
success or otherwise of the process.   
 
In this regard, it is important to recognise that, although decentralisation in its current 
form in Burundi – where it explicitly aims at affording a voice to and sharing power 
with citizens (see Sections 3.1.5 and 3.1.6) – is new in Burundi, the country has a long 
history of decentralised administrative structures which go back to the colonial era.  
As we have seen, history matters, and the history and culture of state formation 
matters considerably.  It is therefore important to examine this and its implications for 
the current process.  We explore this in the following section.   
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3.1.4 History in Burundi 
 
Although introduced in its current form through the Constitution of 2005, 
decentralisation is not in any way new to Burundi.  As Sentamba (2011: 4-6) outlines, 
the history of decentralisation goes back to the colonial period when, following the 
Decree of December 25
th
, 1959 on the political organisation of the then Rwanda-
Urundi, decentralisation was first introduced.  Commune elections which followed in 
1960 resulted in the establishment of commune councils comprising an elected 
„Bourgmestre‟ and councillors serving a term of three years.  However, as Sentamba 
notes, the experience was not positive… 
 
 « ...la gestion fut catastrophe, les conseillers communaux et les bourgmestres se 
conduisant comme les chefs et les sous-chefs d‟antan, notamment en dilapidant les 
biens de la commune. »   
 
« …the management was a catastrophe, the communal councillors and the 
burgomasters acted like the chiefs and sub-chiefs of long ago, notably depleting 
communal resources. »
10
 
        (Sentamba, 2011: 4) 
 
The question is – and it was one raised and hotly debated by participants at the 
research feedback workshop in September – to what extent have these experiences 
changed through the decentralisation process today?  Some small administrative 
changes did occur back in the 1960s however.  Following reforms in 1965, elected 
Bourgmestres were replaced by communal Administrators nominated by the central 
government, and therefore answerable and accountable to the Provincial Governor 
and the central administration.  Thus, the lines of accountability and responsibility 
moved from the head of the communal council to citizens, to the head of the 
communal council to the central authority, his employer.  The system of 
decentralisation from the 1960s forward has been described as serving as a system of 
political and social control, with authority exercised in a rigidly hierarchical top-down 
matter, while accountability runs upward
11
 in a manner redolent of experiences in 
other countries elsewhere. 
 
This system continued, albeit in a much weakened form during the civil war, up until 
2005 when a new decentralisation law
12
 was adopted. 
 
                                                 
10
 All translations from French to English have been done by the author. 
11
 Interview with Elias Sentamba, August 19th, 2011. 
12
 Gouvernement de Burundi (2005b) « la Loi  (No.1/016) portant organisation de l‟administration 
communale » (avril, 2005) 
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3.1.5 Current policy and procedures in Burundi 
 
Decentralisation in its current form, both in its policies and its procedures, marks a 
radical shift from this earlier form.  First introduced during the peace negotiations in 
Arusha, a new commitment to a new form of decentralisation was written into the 
new Constitution of March 18
th
, 2005.  The major milestones in embedding the 
process within policy and law in Burundi are outlined below.   
 
 Decentralisation is written into the new Constitution (March 18th, 2005 – 
see Gouvernement de Burundi, 2005a) 
 A Local Government Law is adopted (see Gouvernement de Burundi, 
2005b) 
 A Government „Policy Letter‟ on Decentralisation and Community 
Development is produced (see Gouvernement de Burundi, 2007) 
 A new Government Policy on Decentralisation is published (see 
Gouvernement de Burundi, 2009) 
 Some minor revisions to the 2005 Local Government Law are adopted (see 
Gouvernement de Burundi, 2010a) 
 
Burundi is currently divided into 17 provinces.  These are further sub-divided into 129 
communes.   Commune councils are made up of 15 elected members (of which at 
least five are women) who are elected in a block as lists presented by political parties, 
rather than as individual candidates. Thus, commune elections tend to be highly 
politicised with a number of interviewees noting that party loyalty and allegiances are 
far more important for candidates than either competency or accountability to the 
electorate.   
 
Communes are further divided into „collines‟ or hills.  There are currently 2,910 
collines with an average population of 2,853
13
.  As part of the 2010 election process, 
elections were held at hill level to elect five member „conseils de colline‟ / hill 
councils. These elections were „non-political‟ in a party sense in that candidates were 
elected in an individual capacity rather than as party lists as at commune level.  There 
is currently no 30 per cent gender quota at hill level although many women‟s rights 
NGOs are lobbying for its introduction.   
 
Some of the broad structural features of the new form of decentralisation adopted in 
2005 appear similar to those of the past – locally elected councils led by 
Administrators who, although now elected by the councillors themselves (at the first 
sitting of the council following its election), continue to be answerable to the 
Provincial Governor and central authority
14
.  However important differences also 
exist.  These relate to the overall aims and aspirations of the new power-sharing 
arrangements, and are clearly articulated in the National Policy on Decentralisation 
adopted in 2009 (Gouvernement de Burundi, 2009).   
 
                                                 
13
 Calculated by dividing the country‟s total population by the number of collines. 
14
 See OAG (2007), OAG (2009) and Gouvernement de Burundi (2009) for more on this point. 
21 | P a g e  
 
Two key aspects in this regard in particular stand out.  The first is the radical change 
in political culture required wherein, reflecting broader global shifts from governing 
to governance, elected and appointed state officials begin to work in open partnership 
and collaboration with local citizens rather than exercising centralised control as in 
the past.  This is described as requiring nothing less than a „silent revolution‟ – a 
complete bouleversement of traditional relations (revolution) in the absence of violent 
conflict (silent)
15
.   
 
 
« [La Décentralisation] favorise une « révolution silencieuse » qui engendre 
un changement qualitatif de la société. La Décentralisation exige une 
nouvelle culture étatique, un nouvel état d‟esprit politico-administratif…  
Tout le monde, pas seulement les élus locaux comme on a tendance à le 
croire un peu partout, est acteur de la Décentralisation. » 
 
« [Decentralisation] favours a « silent revolution » which brings about a 
qualitative change in society.  Decentralisation demands a new state culture, a 
new politico-administrative spirit within the state… Everybody, not just 
locally elected leaders as we all are inclined to think, is an actor within 
Decentralisation. » 
 
(Gouvernement de Burundi, 2009: 56 – translation and emphasis my own) 
 
 
The second related radical difference from the ethos, policy and practice of 
decentralisation in the past is the active role accorded to citizens in the process.  In a 
process aimed at the inter-related areas of governance and development, citizens now 
have a role to play in both determining development priorities and overseeing 
initiatives to address these priorities.  In the governments‟ own words… 
 
 
« .. la Décentralisation vise l‟objectif de la participation active de l’ensemble 
de la population à la définition et à la mise en œuvre des politiques de 
développement économique et social de leur localité. Les résultats attendus 
d‟un processus de Décentralisation sont d‟une part le développement local et 
communautaire, et d‟autre part la démocratie locale et la bonne 
gouvernance. » 
 
« …Decentralisation aims at the active participation of all the population in 
defining and implementing economic and social development policies in their 
localities.  The envisaged outcomes from a process of Decentralisation are, on 
the one hand, local and community development and, on the other, local 
democracy and good governance. » 
                                                 
15
 The term „silent revolution‟, when cited during the research feedback presentation, generated a 
lengthy debate as to what this meant and whether the word „revolution‟ was appropriate in the 
Burundian context.  It was noted that this was the state‟s own wording (appearing as it does in the 
Government‟s National Policy) and that the use of the word reflected the enormity of the political, 
attitudinal and behavioural changes required in how local state and civic actors relate to each other and 
conduct affairs in an open, transparent and participatory manner. 
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(Gouvernement de Burundi, 2009: 10 – translation and emphasis my own) 
 
 
Elsewhere, within this same policy, it is noted that citizen participation goes beyond 
merely consulting local citizens on their views and ideas.  Moving toward the higher 
end of the participation spectrum, citizen participation within local governance in 
Burundi now involves shared decision-making between state officials and citizens in 
relation to development programmes and interventions within their localities.  
 
 
« Le Gouvernement de la République du Burundi a pris l‟option politique de 
rapprocher les services publics de la population et d’impliquer cette dernière 
dans la prise des décisions et le choix des programmes et projets de 
développement de leurs collectivités. » 
 
« The Government of the Republic of Burundi has taken the political option of 
bringing public services closer to the people and of involving the people in 
decision-making and choice in relation to development programmes and 
projects in their localities. » 
 
(Gouvernement de Burundi, 2009: 61 – translation and emphasis my own) 
 
 
 
Thus, as set out in the Government‟s own decentralisation policy, decentralisation 
within Burundi today represents a radical transformation from that of the past.  
Included in this transformation is a shift from top-down to bottom-up planning; from 
talking at people / telling them what to do, to talking with them; from a societal divide 
between rulers and ruled to partners in governance; from ruling over to ruling with; 
from subjects to citizens.  These transformations, as lucidly set out in the 
Government‟s 2009 policy, certainly require nothing less than the „silent revolution‟ 
called for in the same policy.  The question is how does this policy translate into 
procedure and practice on the ground in the communes and hills throughout the 
country?  We firstly turn to an examination of the structures and procedures as they 
are set out in the relevant legislation of 2005 and 2010, as well as within the Manual 
of Administrative and Financial Procedures published by the government in 2011. 
 
 
Current procedures in Burundi 
 
The broad aims and objectives articulated in the 2009 policy find more concrete 
expression in the associated texts produced over the last number of years – notably the 
Decentralisation Law of 2005 and the Manual of Administrative and Financial 
Procedures of 2011, both produced by the Government of Burundi (Gouvernement de 
Burundi, 2005b, 2011).  A number of the key features of both the commune and hill 
councils, deriving from these and associated texts, are outlined below: 
 
Procedures for commune councils 
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 The commune council comprises 15 members elected through proportional 
representation from party block lists of candidates. 
 Co-options are permitted to achieve power-sharing quotas – no more than 
67% from any one ethnic group; no less than 30% female representation. 
 The role of the commune council is to ensure that public services respond 
to the needs of the population (Article 5
16
). 
 The commune council meets three times a year in ordinary session where a 
quorum of ten or more members is required (Article 10). 
 These meetings are public (Article 19). 
 Before March 31st each year, the communal Administrator presents a 
progress report to the council.  The report is sent to the Provincial 
Governor and is made publicly available following validation by the 
communal council (Article 31). 
 Decisions at council meetings are by simple majority, public voting or, for 
sensitive issues, by secret ballot of all members (Gouvernement de 
Burundi, 2011: 15). 
 A record of deliberations of each meeting is kept and extracts from all 
deliberations are posted on the public notice board at the commune offices 
(Government of Burundi, 2011: 15). 
 Twice a year, the council holds open information sessions with hill council 
members and members of local associations.  Participants at these 
meetings may pose questions and propose ideas and solutions to the 
commune council (Article 15). 
 The commune council is responsible for appointing a consultative 
committee (following propositions from the Administrator) to advise on 
priorities for the communal community development plan (PCDC) (Article 
38) 
 The Administrator presents a bi-monthly progress report to the commune 
council on implementation of the PCDC (Article 39). 
 The annual budget is adopted by the council and transmitted to the 
Governor for approval, at the latest by October 31
st
 (Article 58). 
 The transfer of responsibilities is accompanied by a transfer of the 
necessary financial and human resources to carry these out (Articles 77 
and 71). 
 
 
Procedures for hill councils 
 
 The hill council comprises five members elected on an individual first-past-
the-post basis.  The candidate with the most votes is the head of the council / 
„chef collinaire‟ (Article 34). 
 The hill council meets three times a year following notification from the 
council head (Article 35) 
 The role of the hill council is… (Article 16) 
                                                 
16
 All articles cited in this section refer to articles from the relevant law (Government of Burundi, 
2005). 
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o to propose to the commune councils actions leading to development 
and the preservation of peace; 
o to mediate / arbitrate on conflicts between neighbours; 
o to advise the commune council on possible projects for the hill; 
o to monitor the implementation of commune activities on the hill. 
 At least three times a year, the head of the council organises an open meeting 
for all hill residents to analyse the political, social, economic and security 
situation on the hill (Article 37). 
 
Following these procedures therefore, the decentralisation process in Burundi today 
offers numerous opportunities for citizen oversight and engagement.  Representing 
this diagrammatically, the process looks something like the following. 
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Figure 3.1.5:  Opportunities for engagement at different levels of Burundi’s 
Decentralisation process 
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In theory therefore, Burundi‟s decentralisation process represents an historical 
transformation from the rigidly hierarchical, top-down administrative apparatus of 
past decades to a framework and set of procedures predicated on horizontal, lateral 
relations where deliberations and decision-making proceed from the bottom up and 
where heretofore marginalised citizens exercise a real voice in matters concerning 
their lives and livelihoods together with those of their families.  To expect such a 
radical transformation to take place overnight is both unrealistic and naïve however.  
As we have learned from experiences elsewhere, decentralisation is a process which 
takes time and requires a strong and sustained engagement by all parties.  Notably, we 
have learned from elsewhere that continuities with the past are ever-present – the 
history of state formation and traditional state-civic relations are important.  But we 
have also learned from elsewhere that such relations are not static, but are ever 
changing.  The decentralisation process provides us with an opportunity to steer these 
in a progressive, liberating direction.  In order to do so, we need to proceed from 
where we currently find ourselves – engaging with current practices, procedures and 
opportunities with a view to further opening the space for citizen participation within 
local structures.  The following section draws on the primary research conducted with 
key stakeholders both in Bujumbura and throughout the eight communes visited over 
the course of the fieldwork to examine the degree to which policy and procedures are 
being translated into practice within the Burundian process at present.   
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3.2  From policy to practice: Progress to date and opportunities for engagement 
 
It is clear that decentralisation is a complex and multi-faceted process and that the 
opportunities for successful and transformative outcomes are largely dependent on a 
number of key implementation issues.  Drawing on a framework developed by 
Crawford and Hartmann (2008: 14-16), in this section we examine the degree to 
which policy and procedures in Burundi have translated into practice to date, as well 
as identifying the opportunities offered for citizen engagement.   
 
The findings from the fieldwork are examined under seven headings.  These move 
from the procedural issues to the more substantive components as we move down the 
list.  Bearing in mind the fact that procedural issues alone do not necessarily lead to 
effective decentralisation, and also building on the comprehensive work carried out to 
date on these earlier issues (see ABELO, 2009; OAG, 2007, 2009, 2010; Sentamba, 
2005, 2011; and Baltissan and Sentamba, 2011), particular emphasis is placed on the 
three final more substantive components which, as we have seen in Section 3.1.3, 
constitute vital elements in a functioning and potentially transformative decentralised 
apparatus.  
 
3.2.1 The legislative framework 
 
According to Thede (2009), the strongest form of legal support for decentralisation is 
its inclusion in the national constitution, consolidated by specific local government 
laws.  Weaker legal frameworks include incorporating it into central government 
policy or through decree.  As we have seen in Section 3.1, Burundi exhibits the 
strongest form of legal support for the process, with decentralisation written into the 
national constitution, a local government law and policy.  Burundi is thus well-
advanced at this level.  However, as we have also seen in Section 3.1, a legal 
framework alone is not enough to ensure that the process is effective.   
 
3.2.2 Division of responsibilities  
 
Smoke (2003) notes that a clear division of responsibilities between local and central 
government is essential for decentralisation to work.  The absence of such clarity can 
equate to a lack of local government autonomy and discretionary powers.  Moreover, 
it can mean, one the one hand, that central authorities maintain a relatively high 
degree of control over local development priorities, or, on the other, that central 
authorities abdicate their responsibilities for local development altogether.  Either way 
in the absence of clarity over the division of responsibilities, confusion reigns over the 
roles and responsibilities of the different layers of administration, and accountability 
for key administrative functions remains blurred. 
 
A number of researchers have already highlighted this problem within the Burundian 
context (ABELO, 2009; OAG, 2007, 2010) with the OAG (2010: 70) describing this 
as a „remarkable gap‟17 given its importance to the success of the process.  The 
                                                 
17
 “...une absence remarquable de définition des compétences dévolues à chaque entité administrative.” 
(OAG, 2010: 70). 
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findings from this research support this.  The problem was repeatedly raised by 
representatives of donor agencies interviewed while Administrators and officials 
within the communes investigated routinely responded to the question as to their core 
role and responsibilities with the response that everything that happened within the 
commune was their responsibility.  This is questionable given the presence of 
multiple government agencies and institutions at Provincial level
18
, together with the 
numerous development agencies – some of whom operate through the commune 
offices, and others who do not.  Moreover, public sector wages (for teachers, 
healthcare staff etc...) are organised and paid from the central exchequer while a 
primary school building project underway in communes throughout the country is a 
project of the state President
19
.  What the widespread assertion that commune officials 
– or more specifically, Administrators – „do everything‟ does appear to indicate is that 
many issues are left to the Administrator and his/her team.  However, it remains 
unclear which of these issues officially fall under their remit and which are the official 
responsibility of other state agencies.  While confusing and frustrating for all officials 
involved, this lack of clarity is also a concern in that it undermines any basis for 
public accountability with citizens remaining very unclear as to who is accountable 
for what.   
 
During the course of interviews conducted for this research it was noted by one 
interviewee that a Presidential decree clarifying this division of responsibility is 
imminent
20
.   
 
 
3.2.3 Local government functioning and capacity 
 
Much attention has focused on the issue of capacity and capacity building within local 
government institutions to date.  A low level of capacity – most specifically financial 
and managerial – has been highlighted by a number of researchers (ABELO, 2009; 
OAG, 2007, 2010; Sentamba, 2005) as one of the key impediments to successful 
implementation of the process.  Consequently, a significant proportion of support to 
the process has been in the form of training workshops to build capacity at local level.  
These have been designed and delivered by both international agencies
21
 and local 
NGOs.  Administrators and local officials were asked how much training and capacity 
                                                 
18
 For example, each province has provincial level offices of health, education, agriculture and 
livestock development.  The policing and judicial systems are also administered from a central level. 
19
 This emanates from an electoral promise.  A building programme is underway with the aim being to 
furnish all hills with a primary school.  Local communities provide bricks and labour and „the 
President‟ provides the corrugated roofing, windows and the mason‟s wages. 
20
 Interview Anonciate Ndikumasabo, Co-operation Suisse, August 19th, 2011. 
21
 The principle international agencies involved in capacity building training are the World Bank 
(through its PRADECS programme), the EU (through its Gutwara Neza programme), and Co-
Operation Suisse which provides an intensive support to the process in Ngozi province in the north of 
the country.  A wide range of local NGOs – some contracted by international agencies – have carried 
out training also. 
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building workshops they attended.  The average across the eight communes visited 
was two training sessions of between three and five days a month.  This amounts to 
between a third and a half of officials‟ total working hours and is certainly significant.  
In addition to this, a number of „technical manuals‟ on financial and administrative 
procedures have been produced by the EU‟s Gutwara Neza programme and these 
have been distributed throughout the country with training provided in their use
22
. 
 
A recent comprehensive evaluation on training carried out (Baltissan and Sentamba, 
2011) finds that there has been little or no coordination of this training however.  
More specifically, researchers report the following: 
 
- A non-harmonisation of modules between different trainers and organisations; 
- An overly theoretical content to the modules delivered; 
- An overly short period (3-5 days) for training; 
- Unsuitable sites for training – too far to travel; 
- Inappropriate criteria for citizen selection for training (selected by commune 
officials (the researchers suggest that perdiems and political loyalties play a 
significant role in citizen selection rather than other strategic concerns); 
- An inappropriate lecturing style („la formation magistrale‟);  
- An insufficient level of animation and use of practical examples to illustrate 
theoretical points.  
 
While it lay beyond the remit of this particular research to examine capacity building 
initiatives in any detail (much can be learned in this regard from Baltissen and 
Sentamba, 2011), an effort was made to explore the impact of such training on 
Administrators and local officials, together with assessing their capacity more 
broadly.  While, when asked to identify what in particular had been learned from 
capacity building workshops, none of the local officials interviewed were able to 
come up with specific issues, all emphasised the importance of accountability to 
citizens and appeared well aware that their overall role lies in working for local 
citizens and communities and that, in principle, accountability works upwards from 
these communities.  This is apparent from statements such as “la commune sert la 
population” 23 / “the commune serves the population”; “ce que nous faisons vient 
d‟eux [la population]”24 / “what we do comes from them [the people]”; “la 
décentralisation est une processus qui donne à la population la voix”25 / 
decentralisation is a process giving people a voice”; “nous devons travailler pour la 
population”26 / “we must work for the people”; “notre rôle est d‟aller avec les 
besoins de la population
27” / “our role is to go with the people‟s needs”. Despite this 
awareness however, local government accountability remains low (see Section 3.2.6 
                                                 
22
 Interview Eric Charvet, EU Mission in Burundi, August 10th, 2011. 
23
 Interview Administrator, August 17
th
, 2011. 
24
 Interview Administrator, August 22
nd
, 2011. 
25
 Interview Administrator, August, 25
th
, 2011. 
26
 Interview Administrator, August 30
th
, 2011. 
27
 Interview Administrator, September 1
st
, 2011. 
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below).  There is clearly work to be done at this level.  However, given the relatively 
high level of local officials‟ awareness and understanding of the principle tenets of 
accountability to their citizens, the findings from this research indicate that the 
problem is perhaps more one of commitment and willingness than capacity (see also 
Section 3.2.7 below). 
 
Local officials‟ awareness and understanding of the other key element in the 
decentralisation process – participation – remains extremely low however.  Among 
the majority of officials interviewed, questions on how to enhance / assure citizen 
participation were answered with reference to monetary contributions for specific 
projects, brick making (for building projects), and various other community works
28
.  
Thus, participation is understood as being limited to citizen involvement in projects 
designed and decided upon elsewhere, by others, emphasising citizen responsibility 
without rights.  This is an extremely limited form of participation which effectively 
denies citizens their right (as set out in the decentralisation policy) to substantive 
participation – i.e. a voice in decisions on local community development priorities and 
projects.  This finding is reinforced by the findings around the extremely limited 
opportunities for substantive citizen participation (see Section 3.2.5 below) as 
decentralisation is rolled out in practice.  
 
Taken overall, these findings demonstrate that much emphasis has been placed on 
training and capacity building – although the harmonisation and style of delivery of 
this requires attention – and that this has resulted in a good awareness of the 
importance of accountability to citizens, though a somewhat limited understanding of 
what is meant by citizen participation in the context of decentralisation.  The findings 
suggest that, to put into practice the policy of decentralisation as set out in the 
government‟s own texts, perhaps the emphasis needs to move from training / capacity 
building to „learning by doing‟ – active participation by citizens through the 
procedures available (see figure 3.1.5 above) which will ultimately bring about, in a 
collaborative and mutually respectful manner, the „silent revolution‟ articulated in the 
government‟s own policy.   
 
 
3.2.4 Local decision-making capacity (including budget devolution) 
 
An associated issue to that discussed above is the crucial issue of decision-making.  
While consultation with and deliberation among relevant elected officials is essential, 
the key indicator of any democratic process lies in the decision-making process.  How 
decisions are made and who gets to decide are crucial factors determining the 
legitimacy of democratic processes.  Local government officials have been elected to 
have a real voice in decision-making and control over eventual outcomes.   
 
As we have seen in Section 3.1.5 above, the procedures set out by the government for 
commune councils stipulate that decisions on different matters are made through a 
public voting system where all members are accorded a vote (although, for sensitive 
issues such as procurements, employment contracts etc., decisions may be reached 
through secret ballot).   
                                                 
28
 Travaux communautaires 
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The decision-making process was explored in each commune visited.  Despite the 
procedures stipulated, different methods are used in different communes.  In three 
communes, both officials and elected members noted that decisions are made by 
consensus and there is rarely a vote.  While consensus decision-making can lead to 
greater solidarity and agreement as considerable time is taken to hear, reflect and 
deliberate upon each person‟s contribution, it can also lead to so-called „false 
consensus‟, where the voices and views of a powerful few dominate and over-ride 
those of others.  Constituting a non-democratic „elite-capture‟ of deliberative 
processes, this practice can lead to growing instability and conflict among actors 
involved.   
 
Two communes follow the recommended procedure of public voting (hands are raised 
for or against motions), while within a further two communes, officials stated that the 
President of the Council
29
 takes the final decision himself, following interventions 
from different members.  Again, this latter practice invests decision-making authority 
and control in one individual and goes against both the democratic mandate of the 
council and its members and recommended procedure.  One official claimed that 
council meetings were attended by approximately 100 citizens and that these all voted 
on decisions.  However, this testimony is somewhat unreliable as a) the room used for 
council meetings in this commune (which was visited) clearly does not have the 
capacity to accommodate such a number, and b) this contradicts the testimonies of 
other interviewees from the same commune who stated that only one or two citizens 
ever attend council meetings.   
 
Articles 71 and 77 of the Local Government Law refer to the necessity for a transfer 
of financial resources to communes.  As other researchers and commentators have 
noted – and as repeatedly pointed out by national level stakeholders in interviews – 
this has not yet happened in Burundi.  In the absence of a transfer of resources from 
the central budget, local communes rely on two principle sources for their budgets.  
First, revenue is raised through local taxation.  Given the significant disparities in 
wealth between different communes and indeed different provinces (including the 
high level of poverty and economic marginalisation in many communes), revenues 
raised in this manner differ greatly.  For example, figures collated by ABELO relating 
to the years 2006 and 2007 show a mean income of US$ 50,088 and US$ 57,664 for 
these years respectively with huge disparities between communes (US$8,101 in one 
commune to US$ 1,767,483 in another (2006 figures) and US$ 9,321 in one commune 
to US$ 2,364,158 in another (2007 figures)) (see ABELO, 2010: 52-54). 
 
The second principle source of funds is donors and NGOs.  Both the EU‟s Gutwara 
Neza and the World Bank‟s PRADECS programmes provide funding for micro-
projects in the areas of health, education, local infrastructural projects etc.  The 
PRADECS programme provides funding for projects up to US$ 100,000 with approx. 
3 per cent counterpart funding required.  1.5 per cent of this comes from local 
communities and between 0.5 and 2 per cent from commune budgets
30
.  Communes 
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 The President is elected by the 15 member council at the first sitting of this council.  His role is to 
chair council meetings. 
30
 Interview Thomas Minani, Executive Secretary PRADECS, August 11th, 2011. 
32 | P a g e  
 
can apply to an additional fund, the FONIC – a public investment fund, for their 
commune contribution or indeed for additional projects.  It remains somewhat unclear 
on what basis FONIC funds are allocated however
31
 and the Director General for 
Decentralisation reports that this fund is now to be allocated on a „performance‟ basis, 
although again the precise performance rating criteria remain to be elaborated
32
.  
Commune officials state that they apply for FONIC funds for particular projects but 
are unaware of the criteria on which their applications are judged or the basis on 
which funds are allocated.  Additionally, commune officials and Administrators seek 
funds from other international NGOs that may operate in their commune.  This, 
however, officials report, is necessarily on a somewhat ad hoc basis and projects 
funded are often determined by funders own priorities and interests rather than 
priorities set out in the commune plan for community development. 
 
Evidently, as reported by other commentators heretofore and as noted by many 
interviewees both at commune and at national level, many communes are severely 
short of funds and much of the projects and activities set out in the commune plan for 
community development remain unaddressed.  A strong case can certainly be made, 
as it has been by ABELO (2010) and others, for a devolution of funds from central to 
local level as set out in the Law of 2005.  However, in this regard it is worth a 
reminder that studies elsewhere (see Section 3.1.3) have shown that such fiscal and 
financial devolution is not always ideal, most particularly in cases where there is no 
clear public transparency in relation to both the targeting and usage of such resources.  
Studies show that a devolution of funds with insufficient or ineffective public 
accountability and transparency mechanisms results in exacerbated local tensions and 
conflicts.  In this respect it is noteworthy that all commune council members 
interviewed professed to being unaware and uninformed as to how priorities in budget 
expenditure are determined within their commune currently.  Given the experiences 
elsewhere, it is important that effective and transparent mechanisms of public 
participation and accountability be put in place and operationalised before such a 
financial devolution takes place.  Given the extremely weak resourcing of many 
communes at present, it is in the interests of both locally elected leaders and officials 
and citizens more broadly to ensure that this happens. 
 
 
 
3.2.5 Opportunities for citizen participation  
 
At the heart of the project of decentralisation, as reflected in the various government 
texts on the process, are the twin objectives of citizen participation and citizen 
accountability.  While, as we have seen in Section 3.1.5 and Figure 3.1.5 above, the 
procedures set out in government texts provide many opportunities citizen 
participation as well as for citizens to seek accountability, as this and the following 
sections show, many of these opportunities are overlooked or ignored by state and 
civic actors alike. 
 
                                                 
31
 It proved impossible to get documentation in this regard during the phase of field research and a 
request for an interview with the Head of the FONIC was denied. 
32
 Interview Théophile Niyonsaba, DG Decentralisation in Ministry of the Interior, August 9th, 2011. 
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Little research has been carried out to date on how citizen participation works in 
practice within the Burundian process.  This research focused on particular on this 
aspect by examining participation levels at both commune and hill level. 
 
As we have seen, the key decisions in relation to resource allocations, developmental 
priorities and service provision at local level are made at the commune level.  Yet the 
findings of this research reveal that citizen participation at this level is extremely low.  
None of the citizens interviewed have ever attended a council meeting (where citizens 
may attend but not speak).  Indeed, just 12 per cent of respondents (five male, one 
female) professed to any knowledge as to what the commune council does – and this 
was a rather vague response in the areas of development and the maintenance of peace 
and order.  There is a clear gender divide in terms of both knowledge of the council‟s 
role and activities and in terms of access to the council members and/or the 
Administrator (whose role is slightly better known).  There is also a rural/urban divide 
in this regard.  Thus out of a total of 26 individuals and 16 focus groups interviewed, 
more men (four, including two from the Batwa community) than women (one – 
consulting a female Administrator) have consulted with their Administrator over 
particular matters and each of these live in or in the vicinity of the commune centre.  
For many others, in the worlds of one respondent, “c‟est [le conseil communal] pour 
les gens d‟une niveau superieure” / “it [the commune council] is for people at a 
higher level”, and many noted that it is not possible to personally access commune 
council members – only heads of the hill council can do this.  Furthermore, there is 
little evidence of the twice-yearly open council meetings on the hills.  The only 
evidence of such meetings are meetings called by the Administrator to collect revenue 
for particular projects or to inform citizens that they need to participate in community 
works.   
 
For most citizens therefore, the activities and actions of council members are remote 
and removed from their everyday lives.  Moreover, having been elected from block 
lists of party candidates, many citizens view elected council members as 
representative of and accountable to their party leaders rather than to their citizens.  In 
a highly charged political climate, loyalty to and allegiance to the party is indeed 
extremely important (see also Section 3.3.4).   
 
However, as Uvin (2008, 2009) in particular has noted, the hill councils – five 
member councils elected as individual rather than party candidates for the first time in 
2010 – represent a real opportunity for citizen participation in local economic and 
social affairs.   
 
Among the citizens interviewed for this research, there is a much greater awareness of the 
existence and the role of local hill councils.  Most respondents are aware of who their council 
representatives are.  Eighty per cent of respondents (two-thirds male, one third female) 
identified a role for the council.  It is important to note however that the role identified – 
arbitration and resolution of local conflicts – represents just one of the roles envisaged by the 
government and neither citizens themselves nor members of hill councils interviewed 
mentioned either of the other two roles – advice and proposals of action to the commune 
council (see both Section 3.1.5 and Figure 3.1.5).  
 
Although local conflict resolution was identified as the main role of the hill council by 80 per 
cent of respondents, only six out of 28 people interviewed (four male, two female) stated that 
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they have gone to their hill council with issues to be resolved (the issues were disputes with 
neighbours over land boundaries (three male); theft in the home (one male, one female); and 
family disputes arising from the widespread practice of „polygamy33‟ (one female)).  For 
those that have not approached their hill council, when asked why not, some note that they 
have not yet had issues which needed resolution, while others (predominantly women) point 
out that the issues they face (conflict within their family) are of no interest to (predominantly 
male) council members.  For others, a sense of resignation with the hand they are dealt is 
palpable.  As one (female) respondent notes „toute est la parole de Dieu‟ / „everything is 
God‟s word/will‟.   
 
In terms of the qualities sought (and presumably voted for) in an effective council 
member, there is remarkable consensus across all research sites, and between women 
and men.  Across the sample areas, people identify local „notables‟ / people who are 
well known with integrity, an ability to listen, a sense of fairness, and a „bon 
comportement‟.  Repeatedly respondents note that a good track record as an effective 
community leader is important.  These findings indicate that, while election of hill 
council members is a relatively new phenomenon, the people elected are not 
necessarily new to the role of community leaders.  It may therefore be difficult for 
new entrants to gain a foothold in this forum (most notably women who have not 
enjoyed political prestige or leadership roles at a local level in the past and who face 
formidable obstacles in attempting to enter what is widely seen as a male arena
34
).  It 
may also mean that these fora are captured by local elites.  Moreover, despite this 
introduction of a new local institution, continuities with the past in terms of relations 
with commune authorities are extremely apparent.  When asked to define their role vis 
à vis the commune council, hill council members often used the phrase (and this was 
also repeated by Administrators themselves when questioned as to the role of the hill 
council) “les yeux et les oreilles de l‟Adminstrateur” / “the eyes and ears of the 
Administrator”.  This characterisation suggests more of a surveillance / control role as 
in the past than a role as a conduit for the views and proposals of constituents, as set 
out in current government texts. 
 
This is reinforced in the light of the lack of meetings of hill counsels as set out in 
Article 35 in the Law (the OAG also found this in their research – see OAG, 2010) 
and the lack of public, open meetings between the hill councils and their broad 
population on the hill as set out in Article 37 (the only public meetings any 
respondent has attended are those organised by the Administrator who uses the hill 
council members to call citizens together for either revenue collection or collective 
community works).  Indeed the only regular meeting that is held is a weekly meeting 
between heads of hill councils and the Administrator.  As “the eyes and ears of the 
                                                 
33
 „Le concubinage‟ or „la polygamie‟ refers to the widespread practice of husbands deserting their 
wives (at times they pay some maintenance, at times not) for another woman.  This practice was 
repeatedly raised within focus groups of women (and also raised by one focus group of men) as the 
biggest problem in the area.  As well as leaving women in an economically fragile position, this 
practice also leaves them vulnerable to physical and sexual assault.  It is also the cause of many local 
conflicts. 
34
 It is pertinent to note that the traditional institution of the Bashingantahe – an institution in which 
international aid agencies have expressed some interest in reviving – is traditionally all-male.  
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Administrator”, each Monday morning the head of each hill council comes to the 
commune centre to report on security and development issues on their hill.  
 
Overall therefore, although hill council members (to varying degrees) do perform an 
extremely valuable function in resolving local disputes and „keeping the peace on the 
hill‟, with female members, in the rare instances where women have had the courage 
and determination to both pose their candidature and get elected (see also Section 
3.3.4), proving extremely effective in addressing some of the issues ignored by more 
traditional all male councils, the findings demonstrate that hill councils are fulfilling 
just one of the three role set out for them by current policy and law.  While effective 
on the hills, their representation at the level of the communes falls far short of what is 
envisaged in government texts.  In short, hill council members at present perform a 
reporting rather than a proposing action role (as per Article 36), thereby passively 
rather than actively participating in their hill‟s development.  Representation appears 
more top-down than bottom-up with hill council members (notably the heads of 
councils) representing the Administrator on their hill rather than representing their 
constituents at commune level.  In echoes of the past, as currently operating, hill 
councils exercise more of a surveillance/control function than that of democratic 
representation. 
 
 
3.2.6 Local government accountability 
 
The second objective at the heart of decentralisation is accountability.  Drawing from 
his study of the much celebrated decentralised system in Ghana, Crawford (2009) 
argues that, even in cases where citizen participation is high (such as in Ghana), it is 
possible to have this without accountability.  And so in Ghana, according to Crawford 
(2009), while citizens regularly participate in local policy-making processes, this has 
not resulted in citizens attaining greater oversight and control over their local 
governments as mechanisms of downward accountability remain weak and ineffective 
with central authorities striving to retain power and control.  In the Burundian case 
examined here we have already seen that, although opportunities for participation as 
set out in policy and procedures are numerous, the opportunities on the ground – 
through the practice of decentralisation – are less.  With broad-based participation low 
and with, as we have seen in earlier sections (see also Section 3.2.7 below), the 
centralising tendencies of political authorities high, the incentive for downward 
accountability of local authorities to citizens is likely to be low.  With little incentive 
or indeed pressure for downward accountability in practice, we can therefore expect 
actual accountability practices and activities on the ground to be therefore low.  This 
is indeed the finding from this research. 
 
As we have seen in section 3.1.5, as stipulated in government texts, commune 
councils are obliged to display both the content of deliberations and details of 
decisions reached at council meetings on public notice boards outside the council 
offices.  Of the eight commune offices visited, just two had any relevant information 
posted on their notice boards.  One had posted a notice (in French which is not widely 
spoken) of upcoming meetings, while the other had, in line with the procedures set 
out, posted a record of deliberations and decisions taken from last meeting.  No 
information regarding council meetings was posted on the notice boards of the 
remaining six commune offices. 
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As already noted, the research found no evidence of the public commune council 
meetings scheduled twice-yearly for council members to be held to account by 
citizens on the hills.  Council members interviewed noted that they had neither the 
time (many work full-time elsewhere) nor the funding to carry out such meetings even 
though they are aware that the procedures for commune councils stipulate that these 
be carried out.  Meanwhile, as noted earlier, citizens on the hills remain largely 
unaware of what the council does or who its members are.   
 
Paralleling this, the research found no evidence of the public hill council meetings 
scheduled three times a year with citizens on the hills although, in contrast to 
commune councils, the majority of citizens interviewed are aware of who their hill 
council members are.  The only public meetings that do take place on the hills are 
those organised by the head of the hill council to organise collective community 
works. 
 
The overall picture that emerges is one of representation without mediation – a hollow 
form of representation which, in contrast to the policy of decentralisation set out by 
the government, both fails to accord a voice to citizens except once every five years 
through a ballot paper (and even this is severely limited at commune level due to the 
block party list system in place) and fails to provide downward accountability for 
local authority decisions and actions.  Although a radically new system and policy has 
been introduced since 2005 with the aim of turning traditional political relations on 
their head and moving from a hierarchical top-down, centralised structure to one 
which seeks to actively engage citizens and local authorities in lateral, decentralised 
structures and procedures, such changes in practice are hard to find.   
 
The findings from this study echo those of studies elsewhere.  Downward 
accountability does not just happen on its own, most particularly within a context 
where the tradition has been one of centralised authority and upward accountability.  
As the government itself has noted in its decentralisation policy, a radical change in 
political culture – a „silent revolution‟ is required.  The question is – is the political 
commitment there to bring this about, and if not, how might this commitment be 
nurtured? 
 
 
3.2.7 Political commitment and political culture 
 
In Section 3.1.3 we saw that one of the key lessons from studies of decentralisation 
elsewhere is that state commitment to the process is key.  Yet studies conducted 
elsewhere show that state commitment in many cases has been weak with central 
authorities using decentralisation processes and structures to build clientelist networks 
and support bases for their own consolidation rather than to distribute power and 
afford autonomy and a voice to partnerships of local authorities and citizens.   
 
These findings are extremely pertinent given the Burundian context – a context in 
which the roots of past economic, political and social inequalities, grievances and 
conflict has been described as lying within the state – both within the „predatory 
bureaucracy‟ (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2000: 370) and within the „institutionalised 
system of corruption, social exclusion, impunity, unpredictability, a total lack of 
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accountability and clientelism‟ (Uvin, 2008: 109-110) (see also Lemarchand, 2006; 
Ndikumana, 2000; and Reyntjens, 2005).   
 
In this context, the decentralisation process designed by the Burundian state offers a 
unique opportunity to transform this system, ending the cycle of exclusion and 
conflict and opening up the space for a more equitable and peaceful future.  In its 
initiative in designing the framework and the procedures for the process, the state has 
demonstrated its commitment to such a transformation.  However, as the state itself 
has noted, both state officials themselves and Burundi‟s citizens have to play an active 
role in ensuring these structures and procedures operate effectively to bring the 
aspirations underlying the process to fruition. 
 
The establishment of a dedicated Ministry of Decentralisation and Commune 
Development in January 2009 was one indicator of state commitment in this area.  
However, its downgrading following the 2010 elections to a sub-ministry within the 
Ministry of the Interior is a worrying development and one which could be taken to 
indicate reduced state commitment to the process. 
 
A further complication, and one which has been noted by other commentators 
(ABELO, 2009; OAG, 2007; 2009), is the fact that commune Administrators appear 
accountable both upward – to their Provincial Governor – and downward to their 
citizens who elected them.  Thus while, as noted in Section 3.2.3 above, 
Administrators are aware that, in theory, they represent their citizens, a number also 
define themselves as “agents de l‟état”35 / “state agents” or “représentants de l‟état 
dans le commune”36 / “representatives of the state in the commune”.  As we have 
seen in Section 3.1.5, the annual budget, once adopted by the commune council, is 
transmitted to the Governor for approval.  This is despite the fact that a significant 
proportion of the revenue (both financial and in terms of collective community 
works/counterpart funding) for this budget comes from local citizens.  
 
These challenges are further compounded by reports (ABELO, 2009; OAG, 2007; 
2010, Sentamba, 2011) of frustration and a lack of motivation among commune 
officials at local level.  While this was undoubtedly the case in the past, many 
officials and council members interviewed for this research noted that this situation is 
now much improved and discussions suggested that many (although inevitably not 
all) council members and Administrators are genuinely committed to contributing to 
the development of their commune.  There is no doubt, as in interview Administrators 
detailed their many tasks, that they are being torn in many directions and that theirs is 
an extremely complex and extremely demanding job.  Moreover, questioned as to 
previous posts they had held, it is apparent that this more demanding post commands 
a lower salary than previous posts.  While a genuine wish to contribute to the 
development of their commune is certainly one factor explaining Administrators‟ 
acceptance to take on their demanding role, political motivations are also not far from 
the surface.  As one Administrator noted
37
, he has been nominated by Presidential 
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decree (albeit having been chosen by his commune council).  This brings officials – 
Administrators and council members alike – to the attention of senior party officials 
and there can be no doubt that council membership represents a strategic political 
move as much as anything else.   
 
The development and consolidation of political commitment and the transformation of 
political culture required to make decentralisation a success in Burundi is challenged 
on a number of fronts therefore.  First is the downgrading of the Ministry responsible 
for the process.  Second is the somewhat schizophrenic accountability of both 
commune and council members – upward to traditionally powerful „chefs‟ while 
downward to their citizens who have yet to exercise their potential power and voice 
within the process.  And third is the fact that, while a number of new people have 
taken the courageous step to enter the process‟ structures and institutions, many party 
faithfuls from previous regimes are also present in different posts (including within 
hill councils).   
 
Clearly traditional top-down hierarchical structures remain and, in an environment 
where demands from the top have always taken precedence, this will be a difficult 
culture to break.  To do so will necessitate stronger demands and pressures, in the 
spirit of the decentralisation policy set out by the state, from the bottom – from 
citizens and communities themselves.  As the decentralisation policy itself articulates, 
it is up to everybody, local authorities and citizens alike, to transform the traditional 
exclusionary and divisive political culture and bring about a more prosperous and 
more peaceful future for all. 
 
 
 
 
3.3 Synopsis of key issues 
 
The findings outlined above highlight a number of issues of particular relevance to 
Trócaire‟s engagement in the decentralisation process under examination. These are 
brought together under four headings below. 
 
3.3.1 Citizens or subjects? - The importance of political culture 
 
In his famous book Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late 
Colonialism, Mahmood Mamdani (1996) argues that the British colonial 
administrative system, operating through local chiefs and leaders, made subjects of 
Africa‟s peoples, denying them their rights as equal citizens within their own 
territories.  Mamdani further argues that this form of rule persisted into the post-
independence era whereupon newly elected African leaders continued to view their 
citizens as subjects, accountable to their leaders rather than the other way round. 
 
While Mamdani is writing specifically about ex-British colonies, his analysis is 
pertinent also to Burundi.  As accounts of colonial Burundi attest (Gahama, 1983; 
Hammouda, 1995), the country was ruled in a strongly hierarchical, oppressive 
manner with its population answerable to an administrative elite.  This was the 
context into which decentralisation was first introduced in the late 1950s. 
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The critical importance of history and the inevitable continuities with the past have 
been repeatedly emphasised within this report.  So too has the fact that change does 
not happen on its own.  Active engagement within political-administrative structures – 
beginning at the local level and working upward – is absolutely necessary to 
challenge and transform enduring colonial legacies and to move from being subjects 
to active citizens within a peaceful, open contemporary democracy. 
 
 
 
3.3.2 Capacity or willingness?  - The effectiveness of workshops 
 
The issue of capacity of local actors to effectively engage and work within 
decentralised structures is one which repeatedly surfaces within texts and literature on 
the Burundian process, and is one which was repeatedly raised by all research 
participants over the course of this field research.  Yet, as has been discussed in 
Section 3.2.3 above, findings from this research revealed that a) a tremendous amount 
of work in the form of capacity building workshops and technical guides is already 
being done in this area by a wide range of well-resourced actors and agencies; and b) 
arising from this support, local administrative leaders appear relatively well aware of 
their role vis à vis their citizens (although, as noted, their understanding of citizen 
participation is a little less developed).   
 
Capacity building is certainly a valuable and necessary support.  However, as the gap 
between local authorities‟ understanding (in theory) and actions (in practice) 
demonstrates, capacity building on its own does not bring about change, particularly 
given the immense transformative changes required and the implications these have 
for traditional power relations and therefore access to scarce resources and assets.   
 
The political form of decentralisation set out in the government‟s own texts and 
policy envisages a sharing of power, voice and influence across society – a 
partnership between citizens and authorities.  Such a distribution means that 
traditional power-holders must relinquish some power while the traditionally 
powerless gain influence and control.  There are losers and winners in the „silent 
revolution‟ which sees subjects once more reclaim their rights as citizens.  And the 
potential losers will naturally be reluctant to cede power.  This inevitable fact must be 
acknowledged and interventions with local authorities should move beyond technical 
capacity building workshops to seek to address the lack of willingness (whatever 
individuals‟ knowledge of how decentralisation should work) of traditionally 
powerful actors to embrace the changes required. 
 
 
3.3.3 „Sensibilisation‟ or accompaniment? - Working with citizens 
 
It is never easy to embrace change and to try something new and it is certainly never 
easy to go against the grain and begin to engage with local authorities on a more equal 
footing when relations in the past have been based on social hierarchy and status.  
Yet, following the law, policy and procedures set out by the state, this is what is 
required within the new democratic dispensation set out within the decentralisation 
process.  Like the workshop approach discussed above, this will not happen through 
passive information-transfer / sensibilisation approaches alone.  Peoples‟ eyes as well 
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as their minds need to be opened to the opportunities offered by new decentralisation 
structures. 
 
Building on the traditional sensibilisation methods employed by NGOs to date, what 
is now required is an intensive accompaniment of citizens – going with them to 
meetings, standing with them in their demands for accountability and their active 
participation in the different fora open to them and actively supporting them in their 
transformation of traditional relations.  This is a new and demanding approach, but 
one which is required if the opportunities available are to be ceased and 
decentralisation, as set out in the political and legislative texts, is to be embraced and 
rendered effective. 
 
 
3.3.4 A politics for all – Overcoming disaffection and exclusion from public life 
 
Decentralisation is a political process.  As the decentralisation policy repeatedly notes 
(Gouvernemnent de Burundi, 2009: 10, 56, 61), to succeed it requires the active and 
sustained engagement of all citizens in public – and hence political – life.  There are 
two key challenges in this regard. 
 
First, a significant proportion of citizens have been – and continue to be – repeatedly 
and systematically excluded from political life.  Specific groups in this regard include 
most women (half the population) and the Batwa, although many others have also 
been systematically excluded from active engagement in public life.  Moreover, this 
exclusion is actively exercised not exclusively by formal political authorities but, 
most strikingly, by communities, neighbours, individuals and family members 
themselves
38
.  And so, simply urging individuals from these severely marginalised 
groups to become involved in local structures is not enough.  Nor is working 
exclusively with these marginalised groups.  Efforts to overcome this systematic 
marginalisation need to address broader societal obstacles – among family, friends, 
neighbours and communities – women and men. 
 
Second, the egregious abuse of power by political authorities in the past coupled with 
current politically motivated insecurity and violence (see Boschoff and Ellermann, 
2010; Human Rights Watch, 2009, 2010; Sentamba, 2010, Uvin, 2010 and 
Veneginste, 2011) has resulted in a widespread distaste for and disaffection from 
politics among ordinary citizens across the communes visited (and reportedly, more 
broadly).  Politics is popularly viewed as the principle source of insecurity and 
conflict.  Citizens are tired of violence, insecurity and unrest and many express the 
wish that they just be left alone – wanting nothing to do with politics or politicians.  
This is an entirely understandable, yet extremely worrying situation.   
 
If the political system is the problem, the political system needs to be changed.  
Withdrawal from this system and its structures leaves it, with all its imperfections, 
                                                 
38
 For example, on hills where there are no female hill council members, the suggestion put to female 
focus group members that the election of a female candidate might increase the likelihood that some of 
the issues raised by the groups might be taken more seriously by their hill council was met with some 
incredulity and amusement.  In the words of one interviewee, “la politique - c‟est l‟affaire des 
hommes" / “politics – that‟s men‟s business”. 
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intact.  The only way to change it is through engaging with it.  The decentralisation 
process offers the potential to do so in a peaceful, constructive and mutually 
beneficial manner.  Those supporting such actions need to take the time to openly 
engage with widespread public disaffection for politics and political systems.  
Through their actions of open engagement with citizens and accompaniment in 
participation within local administrative (and hence political) structures, they can 
begin to demonstrate that politics begins at home and change is possible.   
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4.  Conclusion and recommendations for Trócaire’s Governance and 
Human Rights programme 
 
For most citizens, life in Burundi is a struggle.  Against a backdrop of political unrest, 
insecurity and acute marginalisation, citizens get on with their daily lives, making the 
best of what they have yet aspiring toward a more peaceful, secure future.  It is 
painfully apparent to all Burundians that the political system has failed and, with 
recent unrest and intimidation, is continuing to fail them.   
 
The decentralisation process in place since 2005 offers a unique opportunity to 
transform this system at local level.  Embedded within the constitution and within 
national legislation, the process offers a comprehensive and robust framework for 
citizen participation in and control over plans and projects affecting their families and 
neighbours on their hills and in their communes.  And in the many legislative and 
policy texts detailing how decentralisation should work in practice, the government 
has set out its commitment to the process. 
 
Yet despite this robust framework and set of procedures, levels of both citizen 
participation in local governance and local authority accountability to citizens remain 
weak.  This is not surprising.  Studies elsewhere have shown that it takes many years 
for decentralisation to yield positive outcomes.  Studies have also shown that a 
legislative framework and set of procedures will not, on their own, yield positive 
results.  An active and sustained citizen engagement with decentralised structures and 
procedures at a local level is necessary. 
 
In promoting such engagement Trócaire-Burundi‟s GHR programme faces a number 
of formidable challenges.  Among these are a strongly hierarchical political and 
societal culture where, with people treated more as subjects that citizens, 
accountability demands are in an upward rather than a downward direction, together 
with an understandable widespread disaffection with political and public matters. 
 
These challenges notwithstanding, it is clear to all that continuing the inherently 
inequitable and oppressive system of the past will lead only to frustration, anger and 
more conflict.  And on hills throughout the country, most certainly the hills visited 
during the course of this research, there is no appetite for this.  Through a dedicated, 
active and sustained support to local citizens, including those most marginalised from 
public life, Trócaire-Burundi‟s local partners can help bring about a transformation of 
the system which has failed so many people in the past.  In this regard, and drawing 
on the findings and analysis presented within this report, the following 
recommendations are made: 
 
 
4.1 Supporting citizen participation in existing structures 
 
The various government texts on the process which set out the procedural 
requirements of the process point toward a number of opportunities for citizen 
engagement within the structures currently in place (see Section 3.1.5 and Figure 
3.1.5).  Moreover, interviews with local authority officials reveal that they are well 
aware of the requirement that such meetings and interactions take place.  Interviews 
with local citizens reveal that they remain unaware of these opportunities for 
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participation however.  Moreover, both hill council members and local citizens 
remain unaware that hill councils are carrying out just one of their three functions.  
The predominant form of accountability remains upward toward (reporting to) the 
Administrator rather than downward from the Administrator and his council members 
to the hill council and local citizens.  Hill council members and their citizens‟ 
participation in commune council meetings have yet to take place.   
 
One of the key strengths of the Burundian process is that the procedures for citizen 
participation and engagement are set out in the relevant texts and are, in the main, 
well known by local officials.  All that remains is to ensure that they are organised in 
practice and to participate fully within them.  If such procedures were to function as 
envisaged within the relevant texts, they would offer ample opportunities for citizens 
to become actively engaged.  This would be an excellent beginning in the long-term 
process of systemic transformation toward a more equitable and peaceful future.  
 
It is therefore recommended that partners within the GHR Programme acquaint 
themselves fully with the different opportunities currently available for citizen 
participation (see Figure 3.1.5 for a synopsis) and work with local councils and 
officials to ensure that these opportunities are put in place on the ground and that 
citizens, locally elected, and public officials participate fully within them. 
 
 
4.2 From ‘sensibilisation’ to accompaniment: Less zones, more engagement 
 
The enormity of the task to promoting active engagement within local structures 
should not be underestimated.  Active participation means more than just attendance 
at council and public meetings.  It means more than just posing a select few questions.  
It means nothing less than supporting citizens in an ongoing, sustained engagement 
with local leaders, actively contributing toward plans and projects and actively 
seeking accountability from these leaders in their resultant actions.   
 
Given the challenges faced in promoting such active participation, the more 
traditional NGO approach of „sensibilising‟ people / informing people of what they 
need to do will be insufficient and will not work.  As discussed previously (Section 
3.3.3), NGOs need to significantly change their approach from a more passive 
awareness raising to an intensive accompaniment of citizens – going with them to 
meetings, standing with them in their demands for accountability and their active 
participation in the different fora open to them, and actively supporting them in their 
transformation of traditional political relations.   
 
This will require spending far more time in the field and far more time with targeted 
communities – days instead of hours at any one time and weekly/biweekly contact on 
an ongoing basis.  The number of planned zones of intervention for this aspect of the 
GHR programme (as set out in a mapping exercise by partners during the research 
feedback workshop) as it stands makes such an intensive accompaniment impossible.  
Again, a new strategy is required.  It is recommended that partners reduce the number 
of zones of intervention for the duration of this three year phase of the programme 
and assure an effective, intensive accompaniment in just two-three communes each 
rather than attempting to cover a wide number.  As with this research (see Section 
2.6), given the challenges involved, depth and intensity of engagement is what is 
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required.  Supporting substantive and lasting transformation in a small number of 
communes is far better than achieving little or nothing in a large number.  Again, it is 
important to remember that decentralisation is a long-term process, not a short-term 
solution.  Concrete and tangible successes in a small number of communes will set the 
path for similar intensive accompaniment in a further select number of communes in 
future programmes. 
 
 
4.3 Overcoming the obstacles to women’s participation: a gendered approach 
 
The formidable obstacles faced by women in attempting to become involved in local 
structures has been already noted above (Section 3.3.4).  While the quota system for 
commune councils allows for 30 per cent female representation at this level, there is 
no similar quota system at the level of the hills councils.  For many, the solution 
appears to be the introduction of a 30 per cent quota at hill council level also. 
 
In this context, it is worth bearing in mind two things.  One, there is as yet little 
evidence of the effectiveness and usefulness of the quota system in addressing 
particular issues faced by women.  Many studies show that women sitting on councils 
and committees continue to find it difficult to have any influence.   A number of 
courageous and highly committed female members of hill and commune councils 
interviewed for this research repeatedly underlined their difficulties in wielding any 
influence in structures and fora dominated by powerful men.  Their successes have 
been more on an individual level for individual women rather than on a broader scale.  
This is not to say that quota systems do not have their uses.  Rather, it is to say that, 
like the legislative framework for decentralisation, they open the door but, on their 
own they will not bring about change.   
 
This raises the second point which is the crucial fact that gender is not just about 
women.  Political exclusion is not just about women.  And the obstacles to women‟s 
participation within decentralised structures will not be addressed by working with 
women alone
39
.  The marginalisation and exclusion of any group, be it women, 
Batwa, those from particular families, hills etc... stems from the existence and 
persistence of particular values and norms across society – a common understanding 
of what is normal, what is acceptable – the way things are.  Investigating the roots of 
the marginalisation of both women and Batwa within this research, it is apparent that 
the roots of their marginalisation lie not exclusively with political authorities but with 
communities, neighbours, individuals and family members themselves.  Therefore 
efforts to overcome this systematic marginalisation need to address broader societal 
obstacles – among family, friends, neighbours and communities – working with these 
in tandem with specifically marginalised groups. 
 
                                                 
39
 Similarly, the obstacles to the participation of members of the Batwa community will also not be 
addressed by working with the Batwa alone.   
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4.4 Periodic evaluation of existing structures 
 
While there is some talk (although little evidence of action) of governmental 
evaluation of the effectiveness of local decentralised structures
40
, following the 
government‟s own logic of downward accountability, whereupon commune and hill 
officials are accountable their citizens, there is clearly a need for citizen evaluation of 
these structures and the actions of their actors also.   
 
It is therefore recommended that partners working on the citizen participation 
component of Trócaire‟s GHR programme work together in developing an evaluation 
framework for these structures (drawing on previous work done by others in this area) 
and support citizens in evaluating the actions of their leaders.   
 
 
4.5 Coordination of actions 
 
The fragmentation and lack of coordination of actions across both projects and 
programmes focused on decentralisation and those across the development field more 
broadly, both in Bujumbura and also at commune level, was repeatedly noted by 
interviewees.   
 
While involvement in the Trócaire programme offers valuable opportunities for 
coordination and exchange between partners within the programme, it is important to 
also be aware of the interventions and actions of others.  Bearing in mind the 
necessarily limited scale of Trócaire‟s programme (limited in scale, not intensity), 
both the programme officer and programme partners should become acquainted with 
other programmes and initiatives working in this area.  The coordination meeting of 
donors and NGOs working in the area, organised by the DG Decentralisation and 
Cooperation Suisse, is an important resource in this regard. 
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 Plans in this regard were mentioned by the DG for Decentralisation (interview, August 9 th, 2011).  
The government has also prepared an evaluation manual – see Gouvernement de Burundi, 2010b. 
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Appendix I 
 
Map of Burundi 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://www.mapsofworld.com/burundi/burundi-political-map.html 
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Appendix II 
 
Terms of reference 
 
Trócaire Burundi - Governance and Human Rights Programme (BUN11-01) 
Final Terms of Reference (25/7/11):  Research on Decentralisation in 
Burundi 
1 Introduction 
Trócaire Burundi in partnership with its civil society partners has developed the 
„Burundi Good Governance and Human Rights Programme‟.  This is a new 
programme; it has 2 objectives, linked to the GHR organisational outcomes on 
Participatory and Accountable Governance (PAG) and Access to Justice.  The Access 
to Justice Work has been the focus of prior programming while PAG work will be a 
new area of intervention.  The decentralisation process is a recent development within 
Burundi and as such has been identified by this programme as a key space to support 
citizen participation in public life.  The objective of the Participatory and Accountable 
Governance work is; 
to increase the effective participation of citizens, especially women, the poor 
and marginalised, in local government decision and policy making processes.   
The third programme objective relates to increasing the capacity of civil society 
groups to engage with public accountability mechanisms. 
The preparatory planning work for this programme has been undertaken with partners 
and been assisted by a researcher from Dublin City University.  This researcher has 
strong academic interests in citizen participation and has had significant links to 
Trócaire‟s work over several years leading to a strong understanding of our way of 
working.  Trócaire and the researcher have a mutually shared interest to pursue this 
piece of research.   
2 Shared interest in this work 
Trócaire Burundi‟s strategic interests:  The programme wishes to undertake and 
complete a baseline process in the coming 6 months; in part this will seek to measure 
citizens‟ participation or empowerment, understood as awareness and action to claim 
their rights from within the decentralisation process.  A necessary precursor to this 
will be determining which rights in particular this programme will seek to measure 
levels of empowerment on.  In turn, to achieve this, this research is necessary as it 
will assist the programme develop an in-depth understanding of the decentralisation 
process - its scope and effectiveness in relation to citizen voice and rights and service 
provision
41
. An understanding of the functioning of these processes will also be 
necessary so that the programme is clear by which mechanisms and modalities 
citizens are expected to access duty-bearers and secure their rights.  The subsequent 
                                                 
41
 This remained unclear and not clarified at the time of the formulation of the decentralisation policy 
(2009) – part of the research will be to uncover are there different understandings or has this been 
further clarified since the Decentralisation Policy was produced 
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baseline process will thereafter help the programme to develop appropriate 
intervention strategies, set targets and create a basis for on-going monitoring of 
change in the levels of citizen‟s empowerment.  Appendix 1 to this TOR provides a 
timeframe and tentative plan for the baseline process. 
 
DCU Researcher‟s strategic interests:  The researcher‟s areas of interest are in 
governance in particular citizen‟s engagement in decentralisation processes.  The 
researcher is keen to undertake research in Burundi as its experiences have much to 
offer to analysts and policy makers of governance in a post-conflict context more 
broadly.  Literature in the area of governance in Burundi, and indeed in many post-
conflict African countries, tends to focus on developments and dynamics at the 
national level.  However, little is known about local level governance and how this 
interacts with evolving structures and institutions of decentralisation.  As well as 
being made available to Trócaire staff and partners, the findings of the research will 
be communicated and disseminated more widely through academic conferences (e.g. 
Irish Aid‟s Development Education Conference; the European Conference on African 
Studies; the International Studies Association Annual conference etc) and in the form 
of 1-2 journal articles. This will bring the findings of the research to a broad audience 
of researchers, analysts and policy makers.  Additionally, it is hoped that the research 
will be useful to and build on the work of civil society groups within Burundi.  The 
researcher is committed as far as is possible to partner with local academia as part of 
her work.  
3 Aims of research 
This research is part of the baseline process that Trócaire, in view of ensuring 
accountability, considers as indispensable in the beginning of each programme in 
order to allow staff and partners to know where they are starting from and therefore 
be able to measure impact and results of programme implementation.   As experience 
has shown, a baseline is a phased process with various stages.  
 
The Broad aims of this research are as follow: 
3. To assess the opportunities for and challenges to political engagement of Burundi’s 
citizens at the level of the collines (including how, if at all, this might feed upward to 
higher levels) 
4. To assess how such engagement might affect political dynamics / relations on the 
collines (gender and conflict sensitivities) 
More specifically 
1. To identify the key modalities of Burundi’s decentralisation policy at all levels, 
including colline and commune levels – roles and resources – on paper and as 
understood by the different stakeholders with a particular focus on citizens 
perceptions 
2. To identify the responsibilities of duty bearers at both colline and commune levels in 
public consultation and services provision 
3. To understand and assess the inter-linkages (where existent) between the various 
levels of decentralisation 
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4. To assess the appetite of communities on the collines for engagement in politics / 
their views on contemporary politics / politicians 
5. To identify the expectations (if any) communities have of the CC and CDCs42 and 
their locally elected members 
6. To identify the expectations and/or linkages (if any) communities have of the 
Commune councils and their locally elected members 
4 Research Plan / Sources of data 
4.1 Primary materials (to be collected in Burundi and added to...) 
 Burundi Constitution 
 Local Government Law (Law No.1 of 2006 on the Organisation of Municipal 
Administration) 
 National Decentralisation Policy 
 Strategic Action Plan for Decentralisation 
 Letter of Decentralisation Policy 
 National Guide for Communal Development Planning 
 
4.2 Elite Interviews  
(to collate different views on decentralisation; expectations of process (including 
CDCs); division of roles and resources; linkages; donor coordination; 
challenges/any lessons learned) 
 Representatives in the Ministry for Development and Local Development  
 Ecole Nationale de l’Administration (ENA) 
 Key donors of Decentralisation including 
o Swiss; EU ‘Good Governance (Gutwara Neza) Project’; World Bank 
‘Support for Community and Social Development Project’ 
 Elected and public officials at commune level 
 Leaders of national civil society and popular organisations involved in the 
decentralisation process  
 
4.3 Focus groups / Interviews at Colline level  
(Approximately 6 collines (~ 2 per partner) with some diversity in demographics, 
ethnic composition, resources and developmental challenges) 
Through various participatory exercises including social mapping, focus group 
discussions and one on one interviews; 
 identify key resources as perceived by different groups (opening a discussion 
later on access to and control over resources – together with blockages to this). 
 explore how the issues raised within the social maps (access to resources and 
rights around these) were managed in the past, how they are managed now, 
                                                 
42
 CC – Village committee; CDC – Village Development Committees 
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how effective this is, and how resources might best be managed looking to the 
future 
 explore power dynamics on the collines together with resource distribution, 
management and control, and moving onto challenges in this regard and how 
they relate to the rights people feel they have 
 explore expectations of the newly elected CCs/CDCs, who their members are, 
why they were elected, what the ideal characteristics of their members should 
be, what they should be doing, and how (or if) they should interact with / 
relate to elected leaders at commune levels 
5 Outputs from this research 
 The researcher will collate, analyse and disseminate research findings at a 
number of academic/policy conferences and through a number of publications.  
These will contribute toward a wider understanding of the opportunities 
afforded by and the limitations of decentralisation in a post-conflict context.  
 The researcher will produce a report with the learning and findings from the 
research.  This report will be an accessible and practical document that will 
assist the programme in its considerations and reflections on its work.  The 
learning from the research may be something that the programme may use in 
policy and advocacy work on decentralisation issues. 
 Prior to the researcher‟s departure from Burundi, a 2-3 day workshop will be 
held which will present and analyse key findings of the research.  The purpose 
of this workshop will be to assist Trócaire and its partners to further explore its 
understandings of the decentralisation process and elaborate key rights areas 
which the programme will baseline.    A separate event may also be held to 
present some initial findings of the research to government officials and 
people interviewed from multi and bi-lateral donors. 
 Through accompanying the researcher in her field research, partners will gain 
exposure to handling focus group discussions and producing social maps; 
these skills will be useful for the later stages of the baseline process. 
6 Coordination  
This initiative will be overseen by the Trócaire Burundi Programme Officer and the 
researcher and will be managed in a spirit of mutual support and respect for the 
strategic needs of both parties.  The initiative will be supported by the GHR 
Programme Officer in Maynooth who will also be supporting the baseline process and 
on-going development of the programme.  A schedule of appointments for the first 
week will focus on interviews with key stakeholders in Bujumbura (Ministry officials; 
commune elus; EU, WB, Swiss, other key donors and national groups), the 
subsequent 3 weeks will be spent in the collines.  Week 5 will involve preparation for 
the workshop and the workshop itself.  The research will, as far as possible, involve 
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partner staff of those 3 organisations contributing to this objective of the programme.  
It is envisaged that partner staff would certainly be involved in meetings with local 
officials and with communities.  This will greatly facilitate the work of the researcher.  
It will also serve to introduce the programme to authorities and to introduce staff of 
partner organisations to participatory methods of engagement within communities.  
Field research should ideally take place in villages where partners have already or are 
planning to implement their work. 
Trócaire will provide desk space, access to internet and alongside partners will 
provide logistical support for travel into rural areas.       
7 Timeframe 
It is envisaged that the duration of this research and subsequent workshop will be 5 
weeks, commencing early August and finishing by Friday 9
th
 September.  
8 Budget 
Trócaire will support the researcher with a return flight, Ireland-Burundi, the visa cost 
and cover hotel and daily living expenses.   DCU will cover the researcher‟s salary 
and her insurance.   
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Appendix III 
 
Programme of field research 
(August 7
th
 – September 9th, 2011) 
 
 
August 7th 
- Arrival in Burundi 
 
August 8th 
- Meeting with Mr. Didace Kanyugu, Programme Officer Trócaire-Burundi 
- Organisation of other meetings 
 
August 9th 
- Interview with Mr. Théophile Niyonsaba, Director General in the Ministry of the 
Interior 
- Interview with Mr. André Nduwimana , Executive Secretary of ABELO (Burundian 
Association of Elected Officials)  
 
August 10th  
- Interview with Mr. Eric Charvet, Head of EU Mission in Burundi  
- Interview with Mr. Déo-Marcel Niyungeko, Vice-Country Director, the World Bank 
 
August 11th  
- Interview with Mr. Pontien Bikebako, Director of the Management Unit, 
Twitezimbere  
- Interview with Mr. Thomas Minani, Executive Secretary, PRADECS Programme, 
World Bank  
 
August 12th  
- Interview with Mrs. Pascasie Kana, Executive Secretary of OAP (Organisation of 
Support for Self-Help)  
 
August 16
th
 
(with Mr. Bayaga, UNIPROBA & Mr. Kanyugu, Trócaire) 
- Travel to Bururi Province  
- Meeting with Technical Advisor to the Governor of Bururi Province 
- Meeting with Technical Advisor to the Administrator of Bururi Commune 
- Visit to Mututu colline to meet with Batwa (approx. 300 assembled), Bururi 
commune 
- Overnight in Bururi 
 
August 17th  
(with Mr. Bayaga, UNIPROBA & Mr. Kanyugu, Trócaire) 
- Meeting with Technical Advisor to the Administrator of Matana commune, Bururi 
Province 
- Focus group with women and men of Gikoma colline, Matana commune, Bururi 
Province 
- Meeting with Administrator of Songa commune, Bururi Province 
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- Visit to Jenda colline (Songa commune) to meet with assembled group of Batwa 
together with the Chef de Colline and Chef de Zone  
- Overnight in Bururi 
 
August 18th  
(with Mr. Bayaga, UNIPROBA & Mr. Kanyugu, Trócaire) 
- Focus group with women and men Kabuye colline, Bururi centre 
- Travel to Bujumbura 
 
August 19th  
- Interview with Mrs. Anonciate Ndikumasabo, National Programme Officer for 
Decentralisation, Swiss Cooperation 
- Interview with Dr. Elias Sentamba, IDEC / University of Burundi (Political Science 
Department) 
 
August 21st  
(with Mr. Willie Nkurunziza, CEJP) 
- Travel to Cankuzo Province  
- Overnight in Cendajuru 
 
August 22nd  
(with Mr. Willie Nkurunziza, CEJP) 
- Interview with Administrator Cendajuru commune, Cankuzo Province 
- Focus group with chefs de collines (x5), Cendajuru commune, Cankuzo Province 
- Focus group with women (x8) in Nyamugari colline (at centre village), Cendajuru 
commune, Cankuzo Province 
- Focus group with men (x12) in Nyamugari colline (at centre village), Cendajuru 
commune, Cankuzo Province 
- 2 individual interviews – one man, one woman – at the market, Nyamugari colline 
(at centre village), Cendajuru commune, Cankuzo Province 
- Overnight in Cendajuru 
 
August 23rd  
(with Mr. Willie Nkurunziza, CEJP) 
- Focus group with women (9) Nyakuguma colline, Cendajuru commune, Cankuzo 
Province 
- Focus group with men (10) Nyakuguma colline, Cendajuru commune, Cankuzo 
Province 
- 2 individual interviews – one man, one woman – in Kiruhura Urbain, Cendajuru 
commune, Cankuzo Province 
- Focus group with women (x9) – Kiruhura Urbain, Cendajuru commune, Cankuzo 
Province 
- Focus group with men (x7) – Kiruhura Urbain, Cendajuru commune, Cankuzo 
Province 
- Travel to Ruhuri, overnight there 
 
August 24th  
(with Mr. Willie Nkurunziza, CEJP) 
- Travel from Ruhuri to Bujumbura 
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August 25
th
 
(with Mr. Willie Nkurunziza, CEJP) 
- Travel to Bujumbura Rurale Province, Mogongo Manga commune 
- Interview with Administrator of Mogongo Manga commune   
- Focus group with 7 members of different hill councils (including one woman) at the 
central market, Mogongo Manga commune  
- Individual interviews with 3 women and 2 men at the central market, Mogongo 
Manga commune 
Overnight in Mogongo Manga 
 
August 26th  
(with Mr. Willie Nkurunziza, CEJP) 
- Focus group with 6 women at the market in Kayogo colline, Mogongo Manga 
commune  
- Focus group with 7 men at the market in Kayogo colline, Mogongo Manga 
commune  
- Individual interviews (x3) at Kankima colline Mogongo Manga commune 
- Travel to Bujumbura 
 
August 27
th
 
- Email communications with Dushirehamwe to explain the purpose of the research 
and propose a modified programme to that proposed 
 
August 28th  
- Desk-based research on the background legislative and technical texts on 
decentralisation gathered. 
 
August 29
th
  
- Discussion with Mr. Didace Kanyugu on plans and format for feedback workshop. 
- Discussion with representative from Dushirehamwe to organise the week‟s field 
work.   
 
August 30th  
(with Mr. Elie Ndikumana of Dushirehamwe) 
- Travel to Province of Bubanza, Gihanga commune 
- Interview with the Administrator of Gihanga commune 
- Interview with three female members of the commune council, Gihanga commune 
- Interview with two female members of hill councils (Gihanga centre and Rumoto 
moto hills respectively), Gihanga commune 
- Focus group with 12 women in Buringa colline, Gihanga commune 
- Focus group with 3 men in Buringa colline, Gihanga commune 
- Individual interviews with 3 men and 3 women in Buringa colline, Gihanga 
commune 
- Travel to Bujumbura 
 
September 1
st
 
(with Mr. Elie Ndikumana of Dushirehamwe) 
- Travel to Mpanda commune, Province of Bubanza 
- Interview with Administrator, Mpanda commune 
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- Interview with 4 members (2 men, 2 women) of commune council, Mpande 
commune 
- Interview with female member of hill council at Rugenge colline, Mpande commune 
- Individual interviews with 1 man and 1 woman at Rugenge colline, Mpande 
commune 
- Focus group with 9 men at Rugenge colline 
- Travel to Bujumbura 
 
September 2
nd
 
(with Mr. Elie Ndikumana of Dushirehamwe) 
- Travel to Rugombo commune, Province of Cibitoke 
- Interview with Administrator, Rugombo commune 
- Focus group with 8 women in Munyika 1 colline, Rugombo commune 
- Focus group with 10 men in Munyika 1 colline, Rugombo commune 
- Individual interviews with 3 men and 3 women Munyika 1 colline, Rugombo 
commune 
- Travel to Bujumbura  
 
September 3
rd
, 5
th
 and 6
th
  
- Collation and analysis of research findings to draw preliminary conclusions and 
recommendations for feedback and discussion 
- Preparation of powerpoint presentation 
 
September 7
th
 and 8
th
 
- Participation in feedback and planning workshop with Trócaire-Burundi‟s 8 
partners, facilitated by Mr Mark Cumming of Trócaire-Ireland 
- Presentation of and discussion on preliminary findings from research on Day 1 of 
workshop 
 
September 9
th
 
- Travel to Ireland 
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